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1. Introduction 
It has been over a decade since there has been serious deliberation of Asia’s regional 
integration, especially from the financial and monetary perspectives. Because of various 
domestic economic and financial issues, the progress of regional integration in financial 
services has been slow. However, with improved macroeconomic conditions and relatively 
stable markets, Asia is at an ideal juncture in which to revisit the subject and propose 
pragmatic avenues to follow if regional integration in financial services is to take place.
4 
The dynamism of regional integration is not globally uniform, and is strongly dependent on 
common philosophies being developed and various infrastructures being established within 
the region. The worldwide proliferation of customs unions, free trade areas and, eventually, 
common markets, indicates that regional integration efforts are being pursued widely to boost 
the economic capacity of the market and gain competitive advantage through close 
economic alliances. 
For any of these efforts to bear fruit, however, there needs to be a presumption on the part of 
the participating states that competition policy will be applied actively and that the market is 
being used to determine the distribution of resources. Market enlargement is one of the 
major benefits of regional integration, enabling the region to capitalise on economies of scale 
and scope. Regional financial integration assumes that participating states will allow market 
forces to align demand for and supply of financial services in the region, creating a larger 
market that selects services and distributes capital according to efficiency and cost. In 
general, an integrated regional financial market should be better able to provide the 
necessary financial services and capital to those sectors and entities in need within the 
region, as compared to a smaller local market with a limited number of players, fewer 
investment opportunities and a meagre savings pool. 
Thus, a precondition for regional integration in financial services is that financial markets are 
being gradually but steadily liberalised, both de jure and de facto, vis-à-vis other economies 
in the region. While the active engagement of economies in financial services trade is 
essential for meaningful integration, it is probably equally important to have economies 
liberalised within each jurisdiction, so as to maintain a competitive and innovative 
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environment for financial services providers. The level of liberalisation in the financial sector 
will have a direct impact on the level of financial integration that can take place. 
With this in mind, our paper analyses three dimensions of financial liberalisation. The 
fundamental dimension is the competition law environment. The competition regime 
demonstrates a country’s overall commitment to a liberalised and market-oriented economic 
structure within the jurisdiction. The second dimension is the country’s external commitment 
to liberalisation of financial services trade, which includes its schedule of commitments under 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the commitments made in the 
framework of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) or economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs). While there are certain exceptions, the commitments made under such 
agreements represent a minimum level of liberalisation in which a country is willing to engage 
vis-à-vis a foreign counterparty. The third dimension comprises the actual entry requirements 
imposed on foreign counterparties, including procedural and enforcement mechanisms. It is 
likely that there will be a positive or negative deviation from competition law, or from 
commitments to trade agreements. 
Regional integration of financial markets requires harmonisation in all three dimensions.
5 
After a brief analysis of the level of harmonisation in Asian countries in each of the 
dimensions cited above, it is argued that further progress in harmonisation efforts is 
necessary at all three levels, otherwise regional market integration will be surpassed by 
global market integration. To put it differently, global financial markets may become 
dominated by those countries which succeed in enhancing effective competition and 
innovation, perhaps even leading to disintegration of regional financial markets. In particular, 
we consider competition law and its aspects related to the financial sector to be a leitmotif for 
regional integration. In other words, without a robust competition policy, it is difficult for 
meaningful regional integration to take place and to benefit the regional economy.  
In this sense, we consider implementation of the laws and regulations at each of the three 
levels of liberalisation to be as important as the rules themselves. As experience during the 
financial crises of 1997–98 indicates, there have been many cases in Asia where de jure and 
de facto rules have differed.
6   While the divergence has perhaps narrowed, it is still 
imperative that both the rules and their implementation be kept under scrutiny. 
The examination carried out in this paper will be from two perspectives. On the one hand, a 
country’s competition law environment, free trade commitments and actual entry 
requirements will be compared. On the other hand, this environment will be compared across 
countries to illustrate the relative level of liberalisation in the region. Owing to data and 
resource limitations, the research will focus on several Asian countries that represent typical 
milestones of financial market liberalisation, and will not draw up a comprehensive inventory 
for all countries. 
The following section will examine various conceptual issues relating to financial liberalisation. 
The third section will investigate the competition policy environment of a number of Asian 
countries. The fourth section will look into the various commitments made under the GATS, 
FTAs and EPAs by a selection of Asian countries. The fifth section will scrutinise the actual 
entry requirements for foreign counterparties and compare this with the commitments made 
in regional agreements. On this basis, we hope to analyse in the sixth section the extent to 
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which the various levels of competition policy and trade agreements are being actively 
applied in the region, and the effect this may have on the progress of regional integration. 
This paper seeks to demonstrate that financial services liberalisation and proactive 
competition policy implementation are key ingredients for regional integration in the financial 
services markets. Progress in this area needs to be carried out in stages, with overall 
implementation being sequential, but comprehensive. This represents a bottom-up approach 
to regional integration, in which all three dimensions possess similar importance and need for 
progress. We emphasise that financial liberalisation needs to be sequenced at each level, to 
allow the country to integrate the various measures taken and incorporate them into the 
market infrastructure. Safeguards must also be put in place to satisfy domestic concerns that 
will be a priority to any country. Such safeguards will include not only balance-of-payments or 
emergency protection measures to be invoked in the event of a financial crisis or threat 
thereof, but also domestic financial infrastructure, such as deposit insurance schemes. 
2.  Conceptual issues at stake 
The extent to which foreign firms can operate in a certain sector affects the speed at which 
the financial sector develops. For both emerging and developing countries, opening their 
financial markets to foreign financial services providers raises the possibility of domestic 
financial institutions being taken over by foreign firms. This may lead eventually to the 
financial sector being monopolised by foreign interests. Hence, most countries do not agree 
to the complete opening of their financial markets, and usually place certain restrictions on 
their liberalisation. 
The form in which the participation of foreign financial services providers is permitted will 
depend on the country’s perception of the benefits it will derive from liberalisation. Also, the 
country will need to take into consideration the competitive effect that liberalisation will have. 
As the possible number of participants in the market increases, there will be greater 
competitive tension, which will equate to a more robust competition environment. 
To step back slightly, the rationale for a country to restrict the financial system is twofold: 
developmental reasons, and rent-seeking. Rent-seeking often comes in the form of 
favourable interest rates and specialised financial institutions. It may also come with a high 
price attached, that of lax credit policies and mounting non-performing loans. Many 
developing countries also establish “strategic” industries to channel resources.
7 It is often 
taken for granted that the regulator will act in the best interest of the public.
8 However, 
regulators may lack appropriate and sufficient authority to enforce rules effectively.
9 
Such diverging views make it imperative that a lively discussion take place within the country 
to promote understanding of the rationale for financial liberalisation, its possible impact and 
the form in which the country wishes to achieve a liberalised market. Developed countries 
tend to demand the opening of markets based on mutual commitments. This is 
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advantageous to countries that already have a developed and liberalised market. 
Negotiations in financial services have reflected this tendency, with developed financial 
market countries making liberalisation demands on emerging market countries, and 
emerging market countries compromising to reach an agreement. This is usually the result of 
horse-trading, with developing countries and developed countries compromising in different 
markets to reach an overall agreement. 
A.  Benefits of financial liberalisation
10 
It is essential to understand the benefits of financial services trade liberalisation in order to 
comprehend the influence of competition policy and GATS negotiations. No member is being 
forced to make specific commitments, but commitments are made for the sake of the overall 
welfare that might be achieved through the World Trade Organization (WTO).
11 Competition 
policies will enable a competition regime to be established, thereby minimising the negative 
effects of competitive markets and laying down the rules for fair competition. 
This section considers the general benefits of trade liberalisation and those attributable to 
financial services. The arguments for trade liberalisation are generally applicable to finance, 
although there are additional factors unique to finance as well. 
(1) Economic  benefits 
In general economic theory, the participation of foreign firms in the financial market has 
multiple beneficial effects and some negative ones. There are a number of barriers and 
restrictions when a financial institution enters a foreign financial market. Management theory 
predicts that since foreign firms are not familiar with the customs, information and knowledge 
of the local market, there will be added information and transaction costs to overcome. This 
is disadvantageous to foreign firms, and is called the “liability of foreignness”.
12 Thus, local 
firms initially have a natural advantage. 
Despite the difficulties that foreign firms might have in entering a local market, there is 
potentially great merit in permitting their entry. This has been widely appreciated for goods,
13 
but not so well for services.  
Financial services liberalisation would allow foreign financial institutions to participate in the 
market, improving competition and market efficiency. Efficiency gains in financial services 
would be in terms of economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale can be gained by 
focusing on a specific area. Fixed costs would become lower per unit, and specialisation 
would be possible. Economies of scope can be gained when one institution provides cross-
sectoral services that take advantage of its network and resources. Such an institution would 
be able to respond better to the needs of consumers. Competition from foreign financial 
institutions that are managed more cost-consciously would prompt local institutions to review 
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their management and cost structure. This would result in lower prices and better services for 
consumers.
14 
Research suggests a correlation between market liberalisation and economic growth.
15 The 
improved efficiency of local financial institutions as a result of competition from foreign 
financial institutions would contribute to the development of the markets through better and 
cheaper financial intermediation. This, in turn, would enhance the profitability of local 
financial institutions and increase economic growth. 
Furthermore, efficiency lowers financial institutions’ lending cost, possibly leading to 
growth.
16 Often, when foreign firms enter the market, their entry induces foreign capital inflow 
as well. This adds to foreign investment, a prerequisite for economic growth in a country 
short on domestic savings. 
Liberalisation is also said to have real economic benefits, although the data are not always 
clear-cut. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
estimated that gains in potential GDP per capita from pro-competitive reforms may be 
substantial for developing countries. As Table 1 indicates, pro-competitive trade reforms 
have the potential to bring substantial economic benefits on an individual basis. The World 
Bank estimates that more globalised developing countries generate growth averaging 5% a 
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(2) Managerial  expertise 
Some of the greatest advantages of market liberalisation in services, however, come from 
transfers of soft elements, such as information, know-how and technology. In addition, the 
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entry of foreign financial institutions brings potential improvements in general management, 
accounting, database processing, and corporate governance.
18 These would all be beneficial 
to the consumer. 
Transfer of technology, know-how and personnel would take place, contributing to the 
formation of a basic market infrastructure. This enables (or forces) local firms to innovate in 
processes and services to cater for the local market, and to become competitive in their own 
right. 
(3) Regulatory  implications 
Permitting foreign firms to enter the market is often accompanied by the lowering of entry 
requirements and clarification of their content, or vice versa. This is to ensure that all parties 
are on an equal footing and will be judged according to the same criteria. It also corresponds 
to the specific GATS commitment regarding national treatment.
19  This helps to rule out 
arbitrary decisions and encourages better drafting, disclosure and scrutiny of regulatory 
rules.  
Foreign firms enter the market either by establishing a new commercial presence or by 
purchasing a local business. Either way, clear entry and/or takeover requirements must be 
disclosed, so that the appropriate form of market participation can be determined on an 
economically viable basis. 
If financial market liberalisation takes place too rapidly, while prudential regulation and 
market infrastructure are weak, the financial market could be dominated by foreign firms 
seeking short-term profits in a predatory manner. Accompanied by short-term capital inflows 
and eventually by outflows, this can lead to wide fluctuations and turbulence in domestic 
financial markets, and does not bode well for national sentiment. The sudden outflow of 
capital in times of shock, in particular, has been condemned as the root cause of the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, and has given rise to harsh expressions of anti-foreign 
sentiment. 
However, the threat from foreign firms needs to be viewed in the long run and placed within a 
larger picture. It can be argued that countries with smaller economies will benefit from open 
markets, as external forces will absorb any major disruption, limiting systemic risk to 
domestic markets.
20  When the host country economy is either stagnant or in a crisis 
situation, a foreign financial institution, which often has a more diversified portfolio, can 
provide stability to the financial system.
21 
This can be countered by arguing that when the market is opened and foreign personnel 
enter the market, the host country may become susceptible to economic difficulties affecting 
the home country or the wider international financial market.
22 Rapid opening of the financial 
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market may have certain repercussions, and therefore appropriate measures need to be 
considered to limit negative effects, particularly through prudential regulation. Also, some 
types of financial services liberalisation are more conducive to financial stability than are 
others.
23 
A society-wide discussion needs to take place to promote understanding of the possible 
negative and positive effects that liberalisation may have on the domestic economy. This is 
an essential prerequisite since the initial economic outcome may be positive or negative. The 
market opening also needs to be carried out in a sequenced manner so that the economy 
can adjust to changes and a consensus can emerge on the progress taking place. A country 
which, for whatever reason, is reluctant to liberalise all financial services trade and capital 
flows immediately should still consider liberalising those types of trade which promote 
stability and efficiency in the financial system. Such financial services trade liberalisation 
(i)  promotes trade in a broad array of financial instruments; (ii) allows the commercial 
presence or local establishment of foreign financial institutions (Mode 3 trade in GATS 
terms); (iii) does not unduly restrict the business operations of similar local establishments; 
(iv) strengthens institutional capacity (such as transparency, regulation and supervision, 
etc.); and (v) improves financial sector efficiency.
24 Liberalisation of this nature is also likely 
to promote less distorted and volatile capital flows, both directly through the types of financial 
flows it encourages, and indirectly through its effect on institutional capacity.
25 
Often, the possible impact of liberalising a financial market is not well perceived by the 
domestic economy. Protectionism can be rife, and so-called “vultures” from abroad have 
been criticised for abusing and even destroying the local economy and reaping excessive 
profits.
26 However, financial services liberalisation is not a simple question of whether or not 
to open the market. Liberalisation is inevitable for any economy that has either an excess or 
a shortage of domestic savings. Furthermore, when economies are increasingly globalised, 
remaining oblivious to financial services trade liberalisation is not possible. In the case of 
trade in goods, it is difficult to remain isolated from trade with other countries when all 
countries depend on trade with others for economic development. This holds equally for 
financial market liberalisation, since financial services are a necessary component of a 
growing economy through their intermediation in the flow of savings to productive 
investment.
27 
That being the case, preparation and planning for a well coordinated and appropriately 
sequenced liberalisation are what is required. This would enable countries to reap the 
maximum benefits from liberalisation of financial services. If diplomatic negotiations lead to 
liberalisation of financial services under the pressure of market forces, a country should 
maximise the benefits by developing well coordinated policies and implementing them in a 
strategic manner. Global financial services liberalisation is an opportunity to be seized, not a 
disaster in which the only option is the insulation of domestic markets. 
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B.  Patterns and path of liberalisation 
As discussed above, the advantages of financial liberalisation, and its inevitability as a result 
of the globalisation of financial markets, indicate the fundamental need for liberalisation. 
Hence, while the necessity of financial liberalisation is not disputed, the path and method of 
liberalisation is an area in which there is wide debate. Financial liberalisation needs to be 
placed in the context of wider liberalisation efforts, since the sequencing of liberalisation has 
become an essential factor in its success. 
The pattern of liberalisation has been studied in the context of post-crisis financial 
restructuring programmes. In the aftermath of a financial crisis, the limitations of a relatively 
closed financial system become apparent. Governments have often tried to control market 
forces directly by imposing capital controls at the onset of a crisis, only for their efforts to end 
in vain.
28 Given the power of the market, what is needed is not to resist it, but to establish a 
financial system that is robust and resilient in the face of sudden and strong market 
movements. Thus, financial liberalisation must progress in parallel with the strengthening of 
the financial system, and sequencing must take into account the need to establish certain 
institutions and infrastructure. 
There are two aspects of sequencing which are relevant in this section. The first is the 
sequencing of financial system liberalisation in terms of domestic financial institutions and 
markets. This is the more closely felt aspect of liberalisation, in which domestic institutions 
will be strongly affected. The second aspect is the sequencing of financial services trade 
liberalisation, which will have an impact mainly on foreign counterparties. The two are closely 
intertwined, but in terms of policy formulation, the distinction is important, especially for 
developing countries. 
(1)  Trade liberalisation path 
Diagram 1 illustrates the relation between trade liberalisation and domestic financial 
liberalisation. The two are closely related, and the liberalisation programme would not be 
complete without both sides being achieved. 
When considering trade liberalisation independently, regional integration efforts need to be 
taken into account. As mentioned in the introduction above, regional integration often 
proceeds in the sequence of customs unions, free trade areas and finally common markets. 
If such regional integration creates barriers to extraregional trade,
29  participating in such 
regional frameworks can be an obstacle to further liberalisation. 
On the other hand, joining the WTO prior to entering a customs union can induce competitive 
accession to the WTO in a region. This could be more advantageous for small and relatively 
open economies.
30 WTO members will be able to extract concessions from other members 
within the WTO framework, something that may be difficult to attain through a bilateral or 
regional arrangement. 
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Source: International Financial Services, London, “Impact of liberalising financial services”, January 2002, p 3. 
Another aspect of trade in financial services is the issue of capital account liberalisation.
31 
Current account liberalisation is a prerequisite of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
membership,
32 and most countries in Asia are already members. Liberalisation of the capital 
account is related mainly to Article VI of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Capital account 
liberalisation requires removal of controls on the movement of capital both in and out of a 
country, and of any restrictions on currency convertibility. Capital account liberalisation may 
result in a large surge of capital inflows as international investors react to the improved 
investment environment.
33  This often helps the balance of payments, smooths temporary 
shocks to income and consumption, reduces the cost of borrowing and supports more rapid 
economic growth.
34  The problem arises when this virtuous cycle is reversed and sudden 
outflows of capital cause the currency to fall, forcing the economy to shrink and bringing 
economic growth to an abrupt halt. 
(2)  Sequencing of financial liberalisation 
There have been two approaches to financial liberalisation in the past: the use of sequencing 
discussed here, and shock or big bang therapy. The shock approach to financial 
liberalisation and regional integration is more or less applied within the European Union.
35 
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This approach has the advantage of speed, with possibly lower cumulative adjustment costs; 
another advantage is that full-scale reforms are not undermined by partial reforms.
36 
Nevertheless, given the experience of a number of financial crises in which the total 
adjustment cost was considerably high with the shock approach, a global consensus has 
been emerging on the use of sequencing in financial liberalisation. 
This is confirmed most clearly by the chapter on sequencing in the IMF/World Bank 
Handbook on the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The goal of orderly 
sequencing is mainly to safeguard monetary and financial stability during financial 
liberalisation and financial sector development.
37 To comprehend the role of sequencing, we 
draw upon the paper from which the FSAP’s Chapter 12 originated.
38 
Financial markets have a hierarchical order in their development, which is directly linked to 
the order of financial liberalisation (see Diagram 2). The money market precedes all other 
markets, with the foreign exchange market following as the point where non-resident capital 
enters local financial markets. The long-term government bond market is the initial 
benchmark for corporate and asset-backed securities markets to develop, and markets for 
more complex risks may follow. The market for short-term government paper should come 
before the development of the long-term government bond market, although the experience 
in Japan has been otherwise, perhaps as a result of fiscal and monetary conditions at the 
time. Derivatives markets require liquidity and efficiency in underlying fixed income or equity 
markets. Sequencing should assume such a developmental order. 
Diagram 2 












Source: Cem Karacadag, V Sundararajan and Jennifer Elliot, “Managing risks in financial market development: 
the role of sequencing”, IMF Working Papers, no 03/116, June 2003, p 7. 
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Moreover, sequencing needs to be accompanied by an institutional framework, and to be 
supported by sound financial institutions. Systemic weaknesses need to be addressed by the 
regulatory authority in close coordination with the central bank (or the monetary authority), 
and the regulatory authority needs to have appropriate powers to supervise the development 
of the financial markets. Sound financial institutions contribute through their roles as market 
intermediaries, providers of backup credit lines, and holders and managers of traded 
securities portfolios. 
Imperative principles of sequencing include (Table 2):
39 
•  Capital market development with financial stability hinges on establishing the 
institutional infrastructure for controlling both macroeconomic and financial risks. 
•  Market development policies should be comprehensive, and technically and 
operationally linked measures should be implemented together. 
•  Capital market development requires a careful sequencing of measures to mitigate 
risks in parallel with reforms to develop markets. 
•  Policies to develop markets should be accompanied by prudential and supervisory 
measures as well as macroprudential surveillance in order to contain risks 
introduced by new markets and instruments. 
•  The pace of reforms should take into account the initial financial condition and 
soundness of financial and non-financial firms, and the time needed to restructure 
them. 
•  Institutional development is a critical component of building capital markets and 
financial risk management capacity. 
Recent developments in international financial markets, prompted by rising delinquencies in 
US mortgage markets, appear to have demonstrated that financial crises are even more 
contagious today, with the advent of securitisation and proliferation of investment vehicles 
and hedge funds. Risk contagion has become more rapid and complex, increasing the need 
to improve prudential measures and strengthen regulatory cooperation. It would be difficult 
for a country to develop its financial markets and maintain stability without taking into account 
technological innovations and capital movements. This backdrop of market turbulence 
reinforces the view that countries need to strengthen the robustness of their financial system 
with internationally recognised prudential rules and sequential liberalisation. 
While the financial institutions of developed countries are generally suffering from sizeable (or, 
for some institutions, huge) losses from securitized products and/or from shortages of liquidity, 
the impact on Asian financial institutions appears to be limited. This can possibly be seen as an 
opportunity for the latter to increase their role and share in international financial markets. 
3.  Competition law environment in Asia 
A.  Placing competition law in context 
Competition law is the first avenue to be pursued in discussing the existence of competition 
policy. It also indicates a country’s attitude towards competition policy, with enactment of 
such law implying the relative importance to that country of a fair and balanced competition 
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environment. When considering the competitive environment of a country, however, merely 
analysing competition law is perhaps insufficient.  
Competition law is not the only law that dictates competition in the marketplace, or, more 
narrowly, regulates unfair transactions. However, competition law is the hallmark of a market 
economy.  
It should be borne in mind that competition law which prohibits anticompetitive actions is 
meaningless in an environment where there is little or no real competition. Thus, a caveat 
must be entered: the fact that a competition law is established does not in itself ensure an 
effective competition policy. The wider system needs to support this philosophy, for example, 
through civil law and intellectual property laws, or privatisation of state-owned enterprises.  
Another factor that should be taken into account is the uniqueness of the financial sector. 
Traditional public goods, such as a police force and national security, are often characterised 
by their exclusive provision by the state, and competition does not exist.
40 While competition 
policy in the financial sector per se is not necessarily within the scope of this paper, it should 
be noted that, while financial services are not normally considered to be public goods, they 
have often been excluded from the strict application of the competition law regime due to 
prudential and other public policy considerations.
41  Thus, when we consider this in the 
context of financial liberalisation, it is essential to bear in mind that competition law may not 
necessarily be reflected in the financial sector. The competition law regime may well present 
a more ambitious market-oriented perspective than is feasible in reality, or its non-existence 
may not preclude effective competition policy in the marketplace. 
Generally speaking, competition law has three components. First, it prohibits anticompetitive 
practices or agreements (both horizontal and vertical) that restrict free trading and 
competition between firms.
42   Second, abuse of a dominant market position that is 
anticompetitive is restricted. Predatory pricing, imposing conditions on the sale of goods and 
services, controlling prices and refusal to deal are part of such behaviour. Third, large 
corporate mergers and acquisitions which might threaten competition are subject to 
decisions by the competition authority to prohibit the deal or to order remedies involving 
divestment of part of the business. 
The rationale for competition law or policy is ultimately and essentially to improve consumer 
welfare. The objective of competition is to improve efficiency in production and supply and 
enable the provision of goods and services at lower prices and with wider choice. 
When a country decides to enact a competition law, it makes a tacit commitment to adhere to 
competitive market principles, with a certain degree of government intervention to ensure the 
running of such markets.
43  If firms are left to compete freely, since they prefer to avoid 
competition, they will lean towards anticompetitive behaviour. In this case, competition will 
exist without a competition law or policy, but it will contribute less to economic efficiency.
44 
                                                  
40  In recent years, public goods have not necessarily been provided exclusively by the state; certain services 
have been outsourced to the private sector. For example, prison services are being run by the private sector in 
some countries. 
41  See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai and Takeshi Kawana, “Competition policy in the financial sector of Asia”, FSA-FRC 
discussion paper, December 2007. 
42   Horizontal agreements are agreements between firms in the same industry involving, for example, price fixing, 
market division and boycotts of third parties. Vertical agreements include agreements between suppliers and 
buyers of intermediate inputs or final goods, such as exclusive dealing or resale price controls. 
43   See Dennis Swann, Competition and consumer protection, Penguin, 1979, p 21. 
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This section will provide an overview of the competition laws of Asian countries with a view to 
understanding the level of importance that competition law has been given in the region. The 
objective is not to delve into the detail of the provisions, but to grasp the commitment to a 
liberalised, market-oriented economy. 
B. Competition  laws 
The enactment of competition law is a prerequisite for developing countries trying to 
establish a sound economic law infrastructure. However, developing countries may 
occasionally feel that competition law contradicts their development goals. This fear needs to 
be overcome and balanced in order for these countries to embrace the comprehensive 
benefits of well defined competition law and for greater economic growth to be achieved.  
Competition law in Asia has often been brought about by external factors, such as 
membership of the WTO, or FTAs/EPAs that explicitly or implicitly require a competition law 
regime. Alternatively, countries may deem a competition law necessary as a result of such 
membership, in order to legitimately control the entry and activities of foreign firms.
45 If a firm 
with a dominant market position enters the country and behaves anticompetitively or abuses 
the market, it will become necessary to institute a competition law to manage such activities 
on the part of the firm. Furthermore, competition law is increasingly becoming a prerequisite 
for participation in the international economy. 
(1)  Enactment of competition laws 
The landscape of competition laws in Asia is diverse. Since the objective of this paper is 
more to draw comparisons than to provide a detailed analysis of competition provisions, we 
draw upon a number of surveys covering the countries that we are investigating in this 
section in order to comprehend the overall competition policy of the region. 
Most countries, with the exception of Korea and Japan, have only recently established their 
competition laws, or are still in the process of introducing such legislation, and lack 
substantial experience in the implementation of those laws (Table 3). China adopted its Anti-
Monopoly Law in July 2007, to be enforced as from August 2008.
46  Malaysia and the 
Philippines have draft competition statutes, but their legislative timetables are unclear. 
Thailand and India have relatively new competition laws, but they lack guidelines and cases 
for effective implementation. While a competition law is not necessarily required for a country 
to apply competition policy to the financial sector, the presence of a competition law 
generally bodes well for the effective implementation of such a policy. 
The group of countries analysed in this section can be generally classified into three groups. 
The first group includes countries such as Japan and Korea, which have both developed 
various guidelines and evaluated many cases, and which have a well developed competition 
regime. The second group includes those countries which have established their competition 
laws relatively recently and which therefore lack the experience necessary to enhance their 
competition policy regime. This group covers a wide range of countries, but they have in 
common the ongoing process of establishing a meaningful competition regime and asserting 
the authority of the competition authority. India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand are the 
                                                  
45   See Makoto Kurita, “International rule-making in competition law and the effect on legal systems of developing 
countries”, in  Shinya Imaizumi, (ed), International rule-making and developing countries, Institute of 
Developing Economies (JETRO), 2007 (in Japanese), p 132. 
46  The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the Anti-Monopoly Law in July 2007. It 
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older members of this group, while China and Vietnam are very new members. The third 
group comprises those countries that have yet to enact a competition law. Countries such as 
Malaysia and the Philippines belong to this group; the level of discussion regarding 
competition law varies among such countries. 
 
Table 3 
Enactment of competition laws 
State  Name of the law  Authority 
Japan  Anti-Monopoly Act, 1947  Fair Trade Commission 
China  Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 1993
Anti-Monopoly Law, 2007 
National Industrial and Commercial 
Administrative Bureau 
Anti-Monopoly Commission 
Korea  Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act, 1980 
Fair Trade Commission 
Indonesia  Anti-Monopoly and Fair 
Competition Act, 1999 
Business Competition Observation 
Commission 
Malaysia  Under discussion  Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer 
Affairs 
Philippines Under  discussion  Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Singapore  Competition Act, 2004  Competition Commission 
Thailand  Trade Competition Act, 1999 
(Price Control and Monopoly 
Prevention Act, 1979) 
Trade Competition Commission  
(Domestic Trade Bureau, Ministry of 
Commerce) 
Vietnam Competition  Act,  2004  Competition Administration Agency 
Competition Council (Ministry of Commerce) 
India Competition  Act,  2002 
(Monopolistic and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, 1969) 
Competition Commission of India 
Source: M Kurita, “Establishment of international competition rules and their influence on enactment of 
competition law in developing countries”, in S Imaizumi (ed), Establishment of international rules and 
developing countries – globalised economic statutory reforms, Institute of Developing Economies (JETRO), 
2007 (in Japanese). Updates and revisions made by the authors. 
 
To analyse the provisions of the competition laws, we cite two surveys that we have updated 
and revised. First, we draw upon the work of Urata,
47  which provides a snapshot of the 
competition law environment. Urata’s index evaluates competition laws on the basis of 
whether they reflect the seven concepts identified by Bollard and Vautier:
48 
                                                  
47   See Shujiro Urata, “Competition policy and economic development in East Asia”, Washington University 
Global Law Review, vol 1, 2002, p 19. 
48   See Alan Bollard and Kerrin Vautier, “The convergence of competition law within APEC and the CER 
agreement”, in Rong-I Wu and Yun-Peng Chu (eds), Business, markets and government in the Asia-Pacific 
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1. Merger  regime 
2.  Abuse of dominant position 
3. Horizontal  agreements 
4. Vertical  restraints 
5.  Exceptions to jurisdiction 
6.  Unfair trade practices, and 
7.  Roles, enforcement and powers. 
Table 4 corresponds generally to the stages of competition law in the region, but it defies 
certain expectations, as some newer legislation has resulted in well defined competition 
laws. This is illustrated most prominently in the case of China and Singapore, which have 
recently enacted competition laws and, as a result, have been able to learn from the 
experiences of other countries in compiling their legislation. The level of enforcement is also 
clearly demonstrated, as countries with a short record in enforcement have only scored lower 
on the index, or not at all. Countries which do not have competition laws, but which include 
relevant clauses in other legislation, are also clearly identified here. 
 
Table 4 
Competition law provisions index 

















China 5  10  5  5  5  10  –  40 
Hong Kong SAR  10  –  –  –  –  –  –  10 
Indonesia 5  5  5  5  0  5  5  30 
Japan 10  10  10  5  0  10  10  55 
Korea 10  10  5  5  0  10  5  45 
Malaysia –  –  –  –  –  5  –  5 
Philippines –  5  –  –  0  5  0  10 
Singapore 10  10  5  10  0 5  5  45 
Thailand 10  –  5  5  0  5  5  30 
Vietnam 5  5  5  5  5  0  0  25 
India 5  5  5  0  0  5  5  25 
–  A score of 10 indicates that there is an explicit statement concerning anticompetitive behaviour in this area. 
–  A score of 5 indicates that rules do exist, but they suffer from a lack of clarity. 
–  A score of 0 indicates that such a rule is not stipulated. 
Source: Shujiro Urata, “Competition policy and economic development in East Asia”, Washington University 
Global Law Review, vol 1, 2002, p 21. Revised and updated by the authors. 
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Table 5 is another antitrust index that corresponds to specific provisions. It is heavily reliant 
on merger notification and assessment, and the OECD
49 has added countries to the original 
study.
50 The antitrust index is obtained by adding scores for each criterion included in a list of 
items that are found in the relevant national laws of the country. The provisions are not 
examined in detail, but an explicit mention in a provision merits a score. The higher the 
score, the more specific the provisions of the competition law tend to be. 
Considering that the higher-scoring countries have relatively recent legislation, it is to be 
expected that they would make better provision for the requisite criteria. Countries that have 
yet to enact competition laws are clearly identified. 
As Nicholson admits, there is no guarantee that a competition law is more efficient or 
stronger simply because it includes a larger set of criteria. The implications of the antitrust 
law index are greater for the countries that score zero. These are unequivocally apparent in 
the index score. 
 
Table 5 
Antitrust law index 
Country Index 
India   20 
Vietnam   18 
Singapore   14 
Korea   14 
Chinese Taipei    14 
Thailand   13 
Indonesia   13 
Japan   9 
China   6 
Philippines   3 
Hong Kong, SAR    0 
Malaysia   0 
United Kingdom    9 
United States    21 
Ukraine   20 
Sources: M W Nicholson, “Quantifying antitrust regimes”, Federal Trade Commission Working Papers, no 267, 
February 2004; Sebastien Miroudot, Enrico Pinali and Nicolas Sauter, “The impact of pro-competitive reforms 
on trade in developing countries”, OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, no 54, 15 June 2007, pp 64–5. Revised 
and updated by the authors. 
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References for Table 5 
List of antitrust law index criteria 
Category  Criteria within national law  Score 
Scope Extraterritoriality  1 
Fines 1 
Prison sentences  1 
Remedies 
Divestitures 1 
Third-party initiation  1 
Remedies available to third party  1 
Private enforcement 







Restriction of competition  1 




Limits on access  1 
Abusive acts  1 
Price setting  1 
Discriminatory pricing  1 
Resale price maintenance  1 
Obstacles to entry  1 
Dominance 
Efficiency defence  1 
Price fixing  1 
Tying 1 
Market division  1 
Output restraint  1 
Market sharing  1 
Eliminating competitors  1 
Restrictive trade practices 
Collusive tendering/bid rigging  1 
 
What the two surveys indicate is that those countries which do not have competition laws 
most probably lack the regime necessary for creating and maintaining a competitive 
environment for the economy in general, including the financial services sector. Some of the 
countries that have enacted competition laws recently have, in some cases, been able to 
score well with their carefully formulated legislative acts. It is interesting to refer to the 
position of developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States in the 80  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
index. The United States has a high score, but only slightly higher than that of India or 
Ukraine. The United Kingdom scores only nine, while having one of the most comprehensive 
competition policy regimes. Thus, the antitrust law index is probably only indicative of the 
strength of the regime, and should not be interpreted as a definitive score of the actual 
degree of competition for the market in question. 
(2)  Enforcement of competition laws 
It is recognised that the text of the legislation will provide only a foundation for the regime. 
Enforcement and implementation of the law are significant and crucial for the competition law 
to be transformed into a competition policy regime. This was demonstrated in abundance 
during the Asian financial crises. Many of the crisis-affected countries had adequate 
legislation in terms of the letter of the law. However, it has been argued that the laws were 
not effectively applied and enforced, and that this may have undermined the spirit of the law, 
at least in part.
51 
Competition law reflects this recognition, requiring that a competition policy be developed 
subsequent to, or concurrently with, its enactment. The provisions of the competition law 
must not only be adequate, but must be supported by a strong and robust enforcement 
regime. The competition authority needs to be independent and able to provide guidelines to 
supplement the primary legislation. 
As an indicator of enforcement, we use data on the number of investigations and the size of 
the competition authority (Table 6). For countries that have not enacted a competition law, it 
is not possible to make an evaluation. Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia and the Philippines fall into 
this category. For countries where anti-monopoly laws have been enacted recently or have 
just become effective, enforcement has yet to be carried out. China has just adopted its 
competition law, and the Anti-Monopoly Commission is yet to be established. Singapore’s 
competition law came into effect in July 2007, and no infringement decisions have been 
made. However, the Competition Commission of Singapore does not publish the number of 
cases investigated, so data are unavailable. 
At present, Vietnam does not appear to have investigated any cases or imposed any 
sanctions.
52 Guidelines for industry sectors are being discussed by the relevant ministries, 
and actual enforcement is about to commence. 
India’s regulations impose fees of 50,000 rupees (US$ 1,200) to file a complaint with the 
competition authority. This is very expensive, given the income standard of the country, and 
may work as a deterrent to filing a complaint. Hence, it may have acted as an impediment to 
collecting relevant information regarding suspected cartels. The few investigations that have 
been launched have been either stayed by the high courts or the Supreme Court, or 
dropped. There is legislation in India, but it may lack the means for effective implementation. 
At present, about 5,000 cases are said to be pending.
53 
Thailand’s competition authority appears to have a management and control issue, with the 
number of commissioners being excessive, and arguably not all of them having the requisite 
                                                  
51   See Joseph Norton, Emerging markets and financial sector reform, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2000. 
52  See Yuka Kaneko, “Country study: Vietnam”, in Competition policy of the financial sector in Asia, Financial 
Services Agency of Japan, 2007, p 349 (in Japanese). 
53   See Pradeep Srivastava, “Enforcement of competition policy and law in India”, paper presented at a seminar 
on “Competition challenges in a globalising economy: issues before India”, New Delhi, 4 October 2002. BIS Papers No 42  81
 
 
expertise, thereby weakening the effective implementation of the competition regime. In 
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Korea  –   –  –  304    48    352  416  49,105 49,382
Malaysia No  law   –  –   –    –   –   –  –  –

































































































Note: The dataset uses data from 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
Source: Hiau Looi Kee and Bernard Hoekman, “Imports, entry and competition law as market disciplines”, 
European Economic Review, vol 51, 2007, p 835. Revised and updated by the authors. 
 
Despite the relatively recent enactment of its competition law, Indonesia has been quite 
active in enforcing it. This is obvious in the number of cases that have been investigated by 
                                                  
54   See Shinya Imaizumi, “Country study: Thailand”, in Competition policy of the financial sector in Asia, Financial 
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the authority. However, cases that have been appealed to the judiciary have often been 
overturned, which is said to be due to a lack of understanding of competition law concepts by 
the judges. Procedural inadequacies may have also led to the cases being overruled by the 
courts.
55 
Korea has been very active in its enforcement of cases and in the fines imposed. While the 
number of cases investigated is not disclosed, the number of infractions that are sanctioned 
and the amount of fines are high. This possibly reflects the pressure on the authority to 
control the dominance of the chaebol industrial groups. 
Japan’s enforcement record in recent years is outstanding within this group. The Anti-
Monopoly Act has been implemented for a long period, but during the last decade, the 
experience and proceedings of the Fair Trade Commission have become abundant, as its 
organization as well as its enforcement powers and sanctions have been reinforced. The Fair 
Trade Commission of Japan has recently announced its intention to revise aspects of the 
Anti-Monopoly Act that relate to its investigative power and financial penalties, which are 
considered to be too low.
56 The revision is intended to improve the law’s deterrent effect on 
anticompetitive behaviour. 
The enforcement index illustrates well the real nature of competition policy regimes. This is 
true for the United States and the United Kingdom, which have strong regimes, and is 
reflected in the cases that have been investigated. It may also indicate that the competition 
authority can be managed by a relatively small number of employees, as in the United 
Kingdom. 
C.  Regional trends in Asia 
The discussion in this section demonstrates that, as Asia experienced during the Asian 
financial crises, the issues surrounding competition law reside in its implementation. In 
addition, the amount of information available may correspond to the number of cases being 
investigated. This is probably indicative of the information disclosure policy of the country. 
When provisions and enforcement indexes are compared, it is clear that enacting the law is 
the first crucial step in the implementation of a competition policy regime. Without a strong 
legal framework, a country will inevitably score low on the indexes. On the other hand, some 
countries have been able to establish a comprehensive law by learning from the experience 
of other countries. China and India have relatively high scores in the competition law 
provisions index and the antitrust law index, respectively, which might be a result of this. 
Vietnam also has a relatively high index score in this respect. 
Once this stage is reached, the enforcement regime becomes critical. Countries such as 
Singapore, Vietnam and India have had their competition law regimes for some years, but 
implementation of the law has probably not been strong. Indonesia and Thailand have had 
some success with their implementation. Japan and Korea stand out in the region in their 
competition policy enforcement.  
While data are limited, in comparing the United Kingdom with the United States, it seems that 
the competition authority can be managed with a relatively limited number of staff. 
Nevertheless, the governance structure of the authority and the decision-making bodies 
needs to be defined to ensure that decisions are made fairly and independently. This is likely 
                                                  
55   See Motoaki Tazawa, “Country study: Indonesia”, in Competition policy of the financial sector in Asia, 
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56   Fair Trade Commission of Japan, “Basic considerations towards revising the Anti-Monopoly Law”, report 
submitted to the Cabinet Office, 16 October 2007 (in Japanese). BIS Papers No 42  83
 
 
to become a significant issue for countries in Asia, where the independence of competition 
policy authorities is still in the process of being developed. 
4.  Schedule of commitments under the GATS and FTAs/EPAs 
Financial services commitments are the second most extensive category of commitments 
made by developing countries in the WTO services negotiations. Seventy-three per cent of 
developing and least developed countries have commitments in the financial sector.
57 The 
possibilities that a liberalised financial sector brings to an economy can be vast, as discussed 
in Section 2. However, due to domestic political considerations and protectionist or 
nationalist sentiments, engagement in financial liberalisation has not been straightforward for 
any country. In this respect, the high proportion of commitments made in the financial sector 
is a significant achievement. 
This section seeks to investigate the financial sector commitments made by Asian countries 
in the GATS and FTA negotiations. Finance is a core element for running an economy, as 
efficient financial intermediation enables industries to be developed. Foreign capital can play 
an important role in this process, if countries are able to recognise this and apply financial 
liberalisation measures appropriately.
58 
A.  Overview of the role of the schedule of commitments and its significance in 
the GATS 
General obligations under the GATS
59 are basically non-negotiable, so they are not included 
in the schedule of commitments. However, specific obligations are subject to negotiation, and 
are then listed in each member’s schedule.  
Part III of the GATS
60 requires that specific commitments be made by members in relation to 
market access and national treatment. Specific commitments are subject to negotiation and 
then listed in the schedule of commitments, which states the specific conditions of market 
access and national treatment that members grant for each sector. Parts III and IV of the 
GATS need to be read together to understand the way in which a schedule of commitments 
is drafted,
61 its  content,
62  and its modification.
63  The schedule of commitments is an 
important legal document in that it provides the particulars of market liberalisation 
commitments by each member and is the final product of negotiations between members. 
Progressive liberalisation is an objective of the GATS, as set out in Part IV. This is achieved 
by amending and modifying the schedule to allow greater liberalisation in successive 
rounds.
64 These clauses prevent members from taking measures that are regressive or that 
                                                  
57   See J Marchetti, “Developing countries in the WTO services negotiations”, WTO staff working paper, 
no ERSD-2004-06, 2004. 
58   See supra, Section 2.A. 
59  The general obligations under the GATS are the most favoured nation (MFN) clause and the transparency 
requirement. See GATS, Arts II and III. 
60   See GATS, Part III (Specific commitments), Arts XVI–XVIII. 
61   See GATS, Art XIX. 
62   See GATS, Art XX. 
63   See GATS, Art XXI. 
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seek to maintain the status quo. Members must endeavour to improve commitments from the 
1995 financial services agreement; this makes their 1995 schedules a minimum requirement 
for future negotiations. 
The article on market access prevents members from making commitments that are based 
on an economic needs test.
65 This is a negative list, in that commitments for the service 
sectors inscribed in the schedule must be made in conformity with the requirements in 
Article XVI, unless limitations are explicitly entered in the schedule as a result of negotiations 
with trading partners in the WTO. Commitments that do not come within the ambit of market 
access and national treatment can also be negotiated and included in the schedule as 
additional commitments.
66 
The details of what should be specified in the schedule are laid out in Article XX. This sets 
out the commitments, together with Article XVI. Each schedule should state:
67 
•  Terms, limitations and conditions on market access 
•  Conditions and qualifications on national treatment 
•  Undertakings relating to additional commitments 
•  Where appropriate, the time frame for implementation of such commitments, and 
•  The date of entry into force of such commitments. 
These items are expected to be included in the schedule, along with further instructions on 
the structure of the schedule.
68  It is also noted that the schedule of commitments is an 
integral part of the GATS.
69 
B.  The implications of members’ schedules 
The structure of members’ schedules will be affected by the legal framework of the country. 
Owing to the US federal structure and its state laws, it became necessary for the United 
States to list the content of all the state laws that do not conform to the basic agreement 
negotiated. For example, insurance regulation in the United States is conducted by state 
insurance regulators, and there is no federal agency responsible for insurance regulation. 
Thus, in its additional commitments, the United States notes that the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners is promoting harmonisation of state insurance regulation.
70 This is 
a result of negotiations with Japan, but if the United States were to harmonise insurance 
regulation, it would result in significant liberalisation measures in terms of the GATS. The 
current structure of insurance regulation in the United States is complex and vertically 
segregated by state. This does hamper foreign firms from entering the US market. 
Part IV of the GATS requires liberalisation to be progressive, and this is to be achieved 
through agreement in successive rounds. However, the experience with respect to financial 
services has not been smooth, with the inability to reach an agreement at the end of the 
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Uruguay Round and the necessity of extending the deadline to enable an agreement in the 
form of the Fifth Protocol to the GATS. 
The progress made to date in the Doha Round that started in November 2001 further 
indicates the difficulty of depending on negotiation rounds to move forward. In terms of 
financial services, some countries have yet to ratify the Fifth Protocol because of domestic 
constraints.
71 While much progress has been made with the accession of new members, 
there remain barriers to the speed of liberalisation of pre-existing members.
72 
On the other hand, some members have made extensive commitments in their schedule. 
Indonesia’s schedule on financial services includes a commitment to extensive liberalisation 
by 2020.
73 
The European Union as a regional community also has a unique approach to the GATS. It 
negotiated as a single entity and listed the divergence of each member state in its schedule. 
Generally, GATS commitments list horizontal commitments in services, followed by sector-
specific commitments. The European Union considers Mode 3, commercial presence, as the 
mode in which liberalisation must be given priority.
74 However, the European Union claims 
that limitations applied through horizontal commitments of members are being abused, 
affecting the financial services sector in particular, by:
75 
• Unspecified  authorisation  requirements 
•  Economic needs tests 
•  Certain limitations on the purchase or rental of real estate 
•  Restrictions on equity holdings 
• Nationality  requirements 
•  Certain tax and subsidy measures 
• Etc. 
The Uruguay Round resulted in progress on commitments in market access and national 
treatment in Mode 3 in particular. More specifically, Mode 3 was the mode in which the most 
advanced and comprehensive commitments to liberalisation were made in financial 
services.
76  Liberalisation of other modes was given lower priority due to lack of actual 
business engagement, or was subject to reservations from regulators.
77 
                                                  
71   Brazil, Jamaica and the Philippines have yet to complete ratification of the Fifth Protocol. See WTO, 
Committee on Trade in Financial Services, “Report of the meeting held on 27 November 2006” (S/FIN/M/53), 
30 November 2006. 
72   To mitigate the difficulty of reaching agreement in multilateral negotiations in the WTO, some members have 
been promoting the use of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that negotiate liberalisation and 
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74  See WTO, Council for Trade in Services, special session, “Communication from the European Communities 
and their member states, GATS 2000: financial services” (S/CSS/W/39), 22 December 2000, para 10. 
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Mode 3 becomes relevant when suppliers of services establish commercial presence for their 
businesses in the territory of another country. Commercial presence is defined in the GATS 
as “any type of business or professional establishment, including … juridical person, or … 
the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office”.
78 The Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services (the Understanding) defines commercial presence as 
“wholly- or partly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, partnerships, sole proprietorships, 
franchising operations, branches, agencies, representative offices or other organizations”.
79 
The Understanding appears to be more comprehensive in its definition, making it clear that, if 
adopted by a WTO member, it allows foreign parties to enter a market in more diverse or 
capital-light forms.  
The European Union insists that commercial presence should be permitted in the legal form 
of the member’s choice.
80 Generally, establishment via local incorporation is more costly than 
branching. Local incorporation frequently requires higher minimum capital, and regulatory 
monitoring is stricter. Local incorporations need to meet the various regulatory requirements 
on a single-entity basis rather than on a group basis. In many Asian countries, foreign 
financial institutions are required to be licensed as local incorporations. Otherwise, their 
operational scope is limited and not subject to the local safety nets available.
81 The 
Understanding provides for full liberalisation of Mode 3 in this regard, but, in some cases, 
prudential regulation calls for certain limitations to be imposed under the so-called “prudential 
carve-out”.
82 Some countries have inscribed this reservation explicitly in the head notes of 
their schedules of commitments; for example, Japan has listed in its head note that it “shall 
not be prevented from taking measures such as non-discriminatory limitations on juridical 
forms of a commercial presence”.
83 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between Modes 1 and 2 in financial 
services, as the internet and other forms of electronic trading networks enable cross-border 
trade to be arguably indistinguishable from consumption abroad. The Committee on Trade in 
Financial Services has been discussing this issue and will continue to do so.
84 The consumer 
protection framework may be different for the different modes. In many cases, consumer 
protection and safety net measures are not provided for cross-border transactions. While 
some WTO members request that the definition of Modes 1 and 2 be clarified, others 
consider the difference insignificant as liberalisation has taken place without such 
classification.
85 Mode 1 may cause greater concern to regulators, as the identification of the 
service provider is normally more difficult for cross-border trade than for Modes 2 or 3.
86 
The movement of natural persons, Mode 4, is sometimes limited in a member’s schedule by 
listing the proportion/number of board members that need to have the member’s nationality. 
                                                  
78   See GATS, Art XXVIII, para (d). 
79   See GATS, Understanding on commitments in financial services, Section D, para 1. 
80   See supra, footnote 74, para 16. 
81   See Hiroyuki Nakai, “The real objective: protectionism or supervisory requirement?”, Financial Business, 
winter 2007, pp 95–7 (in Japanese). 
82   See GATS, Annex on financial services, para 2. 
83   See Japan, Schedule of specific commitments. 
84  See WTO, Committee on Trade in Financial Services, “Report of the meeting held on 19 September 2005” 
(S/FIN/50), 23 September 2005, Section D (Technical issues), paras 65–76. 
85   Some argue that the difference between Modes 1 and 2 should be discussed in the horizontal context, 
covering all service sectors. See WTO, Committee on Trade in Financial Services, “Report of the meeting held 
on 23 June 2005” (S/FIN/49), 24 August 2005, Section C (Technical issues). 
86   Id, para 17. BIS Papers No 42  87
 
 
If the local market lacks officials having the requisite qualifications or expertise in the 
respective sector, it may act as a de facto restriction to entry, since filling management 
positions and jobs requiring higher skills will be more difficult under such a limitation.  
From the standpoint of facilitating the transfer of knowledge and know-how to developing 
countries, and to make the commitment acceptable nationally, it has however been 
necessary sometimes to accept some nationality requirements in the WTO negotiations. 
C.  GATS schedules of Asian countries 
The schedule of commitments is a list of formal undertakings towards financial liberalisation 
by each WTO member. In order to make a useful comparison, we have compiled a table of 
commitments made by Asian countries in the Appendix. The table focuses on commitments 
in the area of banking (deposit-taking and lending) and other financial services (securities 
dealing, trading and underwriting), and does not include insurance services. Also, for the 
sake of simplicity, the mode of supply listed is mainly Mode 3. Practically all countries 
examined have unbound Modes 1, 2 and 4; in other words, they do not permit supply in this 
mode by a foreign supplier. Market access is where the bulk of commitments are made, and 
national treatment is either unbound, exclusive to banking, or for securities listed in the same 
way as banking. 
We are aware of some studies that attempt to quantify the schedule of commitments in the 
GATS to compare financial liberalisation.
87 While these studies provide valuable input into 
the proliferation of liberalisation in financial services, we feel that the variety of commitments 
made implies that a qualitative analysis is more insightful than a quantitative investigation for 
the purposes of our paper. 
Modes 
The composition of the list makes it clear that Asian countries are reluctant to accept modes 
other than Mode 3, which the regulatory authority is generally able to monitor closely. Modes 
1 and 2 are not permitted in principle in most countries, and for Mode 4, natural persons, 
commercial presence is required to accompany the supply mode. 
Timing of Accession 
One of the noticeable differences between the countries that negotiated their commitments 
during the Uruguay Round and those countries whose accession followed its conclusion 
(namely China and Vietnam) may be the specificity of their schedule. The relative intensity of 
the accession negotiations, and more sophisticated scheduling and drafting skills, may 
explain why China’s and Vietnam’s schedules are much more progressive in their approach. 
In those accession schedules, explicit time frames are given for commitments, making the 
road to liberalisation a much clearer path for foreign counterparties and hence for foreign 
financial services providers. 
                                                  
87   Eg, Ying Qian, “Financial services liberalisation and GATS”, in Stijn Claessens and Marion Jansen (eds), The 
internationalisation of financial services, Kluwer, 2000, pp 63–101; Ying Qian, “Financial services liberalisation 
and GATS – analysis of the commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)”, background paper presented at the PECC Trade Policy Forum Meeting 
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“Internationalisation of financial Services in Asia-Pacific and the western hemisphere”, PECC, 
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The relative intensity of the accession negotiations can be at least partly attributed to the 
negotiation mechanism in the WTO, whereby countries conduct a series of bilateral and 
plurilateral negotiations before finally arriving at a multilateral deal. Countries with later 
accession were subject to concentrated pressure from other member countries, while 
pressure during the Uruguay Round negotiations was more widely dispersed among 
countries and more reciprocal. This was due to the strong attraction of the previously closed 
markets being opened to foreign providers. While China and Vietnam have been gradually 
liberalising their economies, previously, the possibility of a foreign financial institution taking 
part in the financial market as a meaningful player had long been a remote notion. At the 
same time, the closed financial system presented great business opportunities for foreign 
players since the saving rates of these countries were very high, while before liberalisation, 
the needs of consumers for diverse financial products had not been realised. 
Geographical limitations 
Countries such as China and Indonesia have geographical restrictions for foreign entry, with 
different rationales. China initially allowed entry into Shanghai and Shenzhen, which were 
already designated as a financial district and a special economic zone, respectively, and 
therefore already had foreign parties operating in those areas. Special economic zones were 
gradually enlarged and then phased out. The rationale seems to lie in initially limiting the 
number of markets that can be accessed, and gradually increasing the presence of foreign 
parties in order to avoid drastic effects on the domestic suppliers/markets, and to enable a 
smooth transition to a more competitive market environment. 
Indonesia has a more country-specific issue, in that, together with its archipelago geography, 
rural areas of the country have very limited financial infrastructure that requires government 
intervention to be sustainable. This seems to be the reason for Indonesia limiting 
liberalisation only to the more populated areas of the country. 
Social interests 
Many Asian countries have scheduled the need for social, public and developmental 
interests to be a consideration or, in some cases, a precondition for a foreign financial 
institution to be authorised to operate. Malaysia and India have included language issues 
related to such interests in their horizontal commitments. Malaysia has a unique Bumiputra 
policy which favours Malays’ interests in economic activities, and this is inscribed in its 
schedule of commitments.
88 Malaysia also includes the need for foreign banks to facilitate 
trade and economic development. The Philippines considers economic conditions and public 
interest when deciding whether to grant authorisation. Korea requires mandatory lending to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as part of its limitations on market access by 
foreign banks. 
Numerical restrictions and economic needs tests 
Although numerical restrictions, such as the number of suppliers, or market share and 
economic needs tests, are in principle to be eliminated under the GATS
89 unless specified in 
their schedule, many countries have in practice opted to schedule various reservations. India 
limits the number of bank licences to 12 per year for both existing and new banks. Malaysia 
limits the number of wholly foreign-owned commercial banks to the existing 13. The 
Philippines requires that 70% of the resources or assets of the banking system be owned by 
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domestic banks, and it has committed to 10 new licences for the period 1995–2000. 
Singapore does not bind itself to allowing any new full or restricted bank licences, committing 
to allow only offshore bank branches or representative offices.  
On the other hand, China clearly states that an economic needs test will not be applied, and 
that only prudential considerations will enter into the licensing of foreign banks. 
Type of legal entity and participation of foreign capital 
Many countries restrict the type of legal entity allowed to foreign entrants, and the level of 
capital participation and investment by foreign banks. Joint ventures with domestic financial 
services providers are often required (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 
Capital participation by foreign financial institutions 
 Banking  Securities  business 
China  Subsidiary: assets more than USD 10bn 
Branch: assets more than USD 20bn 
Joint bank: assets more than USD 10bn 
Foreign investment 
increased to 49% 
Vietnam  Representative office, branch or 50% foreign capital 
joint venture bank 
Parent bank has total assets of more than USD 20bn 
Foreign participation limited 
to 49% 
India  Only through branches of foreign banks licensed and 
supervised in home country 
Foreign equity limited to 49% 
Indonesia Locally  incorporated, joint venture bank only 
Acquisition of local bank up to 49% 
Listed non-bank up to 100% 
Through establishment of 
broker/dealer 
Japan  –  Investment trust must be 
juridical person established 
in Japan 
Korea  A person may own up to 4% of bank stock and 15% 
of provincial bank stock without authorisation 
Only branches of foreign banks which rank among 
world’s top 500 
Only representative office, 
branches or joint venture per-
mitted. Joint venture foreign 
participation minimum is 50% 
Equity participation in 
existing securities firm is 
limited to less than 50% 
Malaysia  Equity participation limited to 30%  Locally incorporated, joint 
venture company only, with 
less than 30% shareholding 
Philippines  Not exceeding 30% of voting stock or 40% upon 
approval by the President of the Philippines 
Foreign equity limitation of 
51% 
Singapore  Single group of foreign shareholders can only hold up 
to 5% of a local bank’s share. A local bank’s share 
held by foreigners is limited to 40% in aggregate 
– 
Thailand  Maximum foreign equity participation limited to 25% 
of paid-up registered capital 
Maximum foreign equity 
participation is 49% 90  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
The schedules show clearly that many countries continue to limit foreign capital participation 
at 30% or 49% thresholds, which is often the benchmark for significant shareholdings. Korea 
and Singapore appear to have strict regimes in their schedules for banks, with a maximum of 
only 4% and 5% bank shares respectively permitted for a single entity. For Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, such limitations vary between 25% and 40%. Vietnam and 
Indonesia commit to allow 50% and 49% respectively, but Vietnam will be easing this 
restriction to permit 100% foreign-owned banks in 2008. Japan and India do not specify any 
such restrictions upon banks in their schedules. 
As for securities firms, many countries limit foreign participation to 49–51%, such as China (49%), 
Vietnam (49%), India (49%), Korea (50%), the Philippines (51%) and Thailand (49%). 
Malaysia limits this to 30%. In general, one would normally expect that from the standpoint of 
the authorities, foreign participation would be more permissible for securities firms than for 
banks, given the relative importance of banks to a country’s financial system. However, it is 
noted that many countries actually restrict foreign ownership in securities businesses, while 
other, often stricter forms of market access limitations are applied to banks. 
As mentioned above, many countries also require financial institutions to be locally 
incorporated and/or take the form of joint ventures, thereby excluding direct branches of 
overseas headquarters. Local incorporation is often required to ensure that the bank’s local 
assets are segregated from the assets of the headquarters and operations in other countries. 
The use of joint ventures may be expected to encourage the transfer of expertise and know-
how to the local institutions and markets, as well as to ensure that at least a part of the 
ownership of domestic businesses remains with local interests. 
Apart from limitations on legal form, China requires that the bank maintain a minimum 
amount of assets, varying according to the legal form assumed by the commercial presence. 
Vietnam requires a certain level of assets to be held by the parent bank. Indonesia insists on 
a locally incorporated joint venture for new entrants. Vietnam, India and Korea do not permit 
local incorporation of foreign banks, committing to allow only representative offices, branches 
or joint ventures. 
Such restrictions are not as prominent or restrictive in securities businesses, although Korea 
requires that any foreign commercial presence take the form of a representative office, a 
branch or a joint venture, excluding wholly owned subsidiaries. Malaysia commits to allow 
only minority-held joint ventures in securities.  
Branching restrictions 
If foreign banks are considering tapping into the capital accumulated by the high saving rates 
of Asian countries, they will need to be able to establish branches and ATM networks to 
provide financial services at the retail level. Branching is often regulated in Asian countries, 
perhaps not just for prudential reasons but also because of other policy considerations. 
Geographical restrictions may have effects similar to branching restrictions on foreign 
financial services providers, since the size of the market in the region may be limited 
(Table 8). Singapore appears to have a strict regime, allowing premises at only one location 
for foreign banks, but its uniqueness as an island nation may mitigate the effect on foreign 




Branching restrictions and ATM network participation 
 Banking  Securities  business 
China  Geographical restriction on business  – 
Indonesia  Geographical limitation  1 sub-branch and 1 auxiliary 
office 
Philippines  Maximum of 6 branches, with 3 at locations of its 
choice and 3 at designated locations 
 
Singapore  Operate from only 1 office 
Cannot establish off-premise ATMs 
Operate from only 1 office 
Thailand  Existing banks to be permitted 2 further branches 
Participation in local ATM network is permitted 
 
 
Local expertise requirement 
Some countries have included requirements to employ local personnel in their schedules 
(Table 9). Korea and Malaysia have kept themselves unbound in this respect, permitting all 
types of reservations on market access. Thailand requires a high proportion of locals to be 
employed as directors in banking and securities. The local employment requirement may be 
based on a desire to limit the number of foreigners operating in the market, and hence limit 
their influence, but it can also be viewed as a desire to elevate the level of expertise of local 
personnel in senior positions.  
 
Table 9 
Local expertise requirement 
 Banking  Securities  business 
India  Local advisory board with SME expertise to 
be established with Indian nationals 
 
Indonesia  Branch: 1 executive position by expatriate 
Joint venture: for director positions, in 
proportion to shareholding 
 
Korea Unbound   
Malaysia Unbound   
Thailand  At least three quarters of directors must be of 
Thai nationality 
At least half of directors must 
be of Thai nationality 
 
Progressive liberalisation and other entries 
On the other hand, some members have made extensive liberalisation commitments in their 
schedules. Indonesia’s schedule on financial services states that “[a]ll Market Access and 92  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
National Treatment limitation specified in the banking subsector will be eliminated by the year 
2020 subject to similar commitment by other members”.
90 This commitment may not have 
been given great significance in the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations, as the timing 
given was a far-off date, and the commitment was very general. However, it expresses 
Indonesia’s clear commitment to complete financial liberalisation through future negotiations. 
This commitment was related to ASEAN’s 30th anniversary, when ASEAN Vision 2020
91 was 
declared. This initiative lays down the marker for ASEAN members to further integrate and 
achieve developed-nation status in a cooperative manner through economic development. 
As part of this endeavour, Indonesia has committed itself to possible full liberalisation by 
2020. However, this is not an ASEAN-wide commitment, as no other ASEAN member has 
included this commitment in its schedule. 
Some countries have incorporated restrictions on local currency businesses. China had 
restricted local currency business until five years after accession, so the present situation will 
have to be assessed to see whether all of its commitments have been honoured in full. 
Vietnam also limits local currency business. Malaysia limits foreign currency deposits for 
residents. Korea maintains a unique position on the choice of currencies. Foreign banks with 
a commercial presence may handle transactions only in Korean won, and assets must be 
kept within the country. Furthermore, foreign currency loans are restricted. The schedule was 
agreed in the midst of the financial crisis in 1997, and the intention of restricting disorderly 
capital movement can be seen from the provisions. 
D. Selected  RTAs/FTAs 
To facilitate the analysis in this section, we consider the following regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) and FTAs which appear to be important for regional integration in financial services: 
the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), the United States-Singapore FTA, 
and the Japan-Singapore EPA. The FTAs that Singapore has entered into may be 
particularly interesting in the sense that Singapore has been strategic in its approach to FTAs 
and liberalisation of its financial sector. The AFAS is an Asian-driven RTA which, if made 
effective, could signal the active engagement of Asian countries in financial liberalisation. 
This would mark a positive approach towards regional integration as well. 
(1) AFAS 
The AFAS is a regional trade agreement in services among ASEAN member states.
92 It was 
originally concluded in 1995, and has since completed its third round of negotiations, with its 
Third Package of Commitments having been agreed in April 2005. Negotiations have been 
held since the Uruguay Round was concluded in 1997, so it is to be expected that further 
liberalisation commitments have been made beyond those in the GATS. 
The AFAS has adopted a positive list approach, similar to the GATS. The commitments 
made in the latest negotiation rounds for Mode 3 are summarised in Table 10. Commitments 
in banking are limited mainly to deposit-taking and lending, and those for securities to 
trading, dealing and underwriting of securities. 
                                                  
90   See Indonesia, Schedule of specific commitments. In the schedule, Indonesia declares, for both banking and 
non-banking financial services, that markets will be liberalised if the commitment is mutual.  
91   See ASEAN, “ASEAN Vision 2020”, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997, http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm. 
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The clarity of the drafting seems to have improved compared to the GATS schedules, in 
which the intentions of the member countries were not always clear. However, whether there 
has been a significant improvement compared to the GATS in terms of actual commitments 
is not obvious, and in some cases it appears that, due to the clearer language, the number or 
content of limitations may have increased. 
When compared to the GATS commitments, while there has been some progress in non-
banking services, the overall situation does not appear to be very different. Rajan and Sen (2002) 
have looked into how far the AFAS has achieved GATS “plus”, and it was their view that 




Summary of AFAS commitments 
 Banking  Securities  business 
Indonesia  2 sub-branches and 2 auxiliary offices 
Executive position can be assumed by 
expatriates only if at least one Indonesian 
national also holds such position 
 
Malaysia  Jointly with commercial or merchant banks in 
Malaysia 
Locally incorporated joint 
venture companies licensed 
by Securities Commission 
with aggregate foreign 
shareholding under 70% will 
be permitted to offer 
corporate financial advice 
Philippines    Limited to 2 branches. A 
resident agent needs to be 
appointed as condition for 
licence 
Singapore  In accordance with GATS  SGX will admit new trading 
members who will be able to 
trade directly in local 
currency securities 
Thailand  Removal of quantitative quota on number of 
foreign personnel permitted 
 
Vietnam  Foreign bank permitted to carry out specific 
operation only in accordance with licence 
issued by the central bank 
ATMs not permitted outside its branch office 
 
 
                                                  
93   See, inter alia, Ramkishen S Rajan and Rahul Sen, “Liberalisation of financial services in Southeast Asia 
under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services”, Centre for International Economic Studies, University 
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(2)  United States-Singapore FTA 
The impact that the United States-Singapore FTA has had on the Singapore banking sector 
is remarkable. According to interviews, opinion leaders in Singapore seem to agree that the 
FTA signed in May 2003 has had a significant effect on liberalisation of the banking sector.
94 
Singapore pursued this FTA with priority over other FTAs, since the United States is one of 
the largest sources of foreign direct investment for Singapore.
95 As Singapore does not have 
a large export industry for goods, the main area in which commitments were requested was 
services.
96 The United States-Singapore FTA goes beyond the bilateral FTAs that Singapore 
has concluded with New Zealand, Japan, and Australia. 
One of the most significant moves by Singapore was the partial opening of its retail banking 
sector to US banks. Foreign banks were to be given access to Qualifying Full Bank (QFB) 
licences and Wholesale Bank licences. Foreign banks are granted three types of banking 
licences: QFB, restricted or offshore. The ban on QFBs was lifted, and branching location 
restrictions were to be gradually lifted.
97  Furthermore, although foreign banks are not 
permitted to join the local ATM network, QFBs would be exempt from this limitation.
98 
The United States-Singapore FTA includes a most favoured nation (MFN) clause,
99 which 
enables MFNs to capitalise on any agreement reached between different counterparties 
which is more favourable than the United States-Singapore FTA. 
(3)  Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
The FTA agreed between Japan and Singapore comprises an FTA and a 
partnership/cooperation component. It was signed in January 2002, and lists Singapore’s 
Chapter 7 on trade in services, Chapter 13 on financial services cooperation, Annex IVA on 
financial services, and Annex IVC on Singapore’s schedule of specific commitments.  
For banking, Japanese banks are allowed only offshore bank branches or representative 
offices. Merchant banks can establish merchant bank subsidiaries or branches. No new 
finance companies are permitted. Japanese banks can operate from only one location, and 
cannot establish off-premise ATMs. 
This appears to be very similar to the commitments under the GATS, and significantly less 
open when compared to the United States-Singapore FTA. As mentioned above, while the 
United States-Singapore FTA includes an MFN clause, the Japan-Singapore EPA does not 
require this explicitly.
100 Therefore, while US banks may be able to take advantage of any 
liberalisation measures, the Japan-Singapore EPA does not automatically grant the same 
advantage. 
                                                  
94   Interviews conducted by the author with Singapore government officials, bankers and banking lawyers in 
January 2007 for a separate research project. 
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Asia – notes on Singapore’s commitments”, paper presented at the 2nd Annual Conference of the PECC 
Finance Forum, 8–9 July, 2003, p 10. 
96   Id. 
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Subsequently, the Japan-Singapore EPA was reviewed and amended in March 2007, and a 
Japanese bank has been granted a full banking licence accordingly.
101 
5.  Actual entry requirements for foreign financial services providers 
Given the above examination of the competition law environment, and the GATS and FTA 
commitments in financial services, we will now proceed to look into the actual entry 
requirements of selected Asian countries. Analysis will focus on the banking sector. 
The objective of this section is to ascertain the effect on actual market liberalisation of 
commitments made in the GATS and other FTAs. In addition, reference to the level of 
liberalisation in each country will enable an analysis of the level of convergence of regulatory 
standards. An effort is also made to confirm whether trade agreements have been 
implemented through real measures. 
Some time has passed since these trade agreements were signed, and some of the FTAs 
have been revised since. Considering the objective of progressive liberalisation under the 
GATS and FTAs, the assumption would be that actual entry requirements for foreign banks 
and securities firms would be more or less the same as or less restrictive than the specific 
commitments made in the schedules. To make for a meaningful analysis, and due to the 
limited availability of the requisite information, we have investigated the actual entry 
requirements for foreign financial institutions in China, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and 
Thailand.
102 
A.  Significance of entry requirements for foreign financial institutions 
Financial services, especially banks, have been heavily regulated compared to other 
industrial sectors because of financial stability and other prudential policy concerns. Entry 
requirements are an important part of this regulatory consideration. Only entities which have 
fulfilled specific minimum prudential requirements to operate in the financial sector, and 
which are likely to be able to satisfy the mandate of maintaining a sound and stable financial 
system, are allowed to enter.
103 
However, entry requirements are not necessarily imposed solely for the purpose of 
maintaining the soundness and/or stability of the financial system. Some entry requirements 
have the effect of limiting competition, leading to efficiency losses and underdevelopment of 
financial markets.
104 This may be the case especially with restrictions on the entry of foreign 
banks, which may be superior in their financial technology and expertise. While many studies 
                                                  
101   Other revisions include the elimination by Singapore of a numerical quota on granting of wholesale banking 
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102  Inter alia, the data used in this section were collected for a research project sponsored by the Financial 
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104  Id, p 50. 96  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
have shown that easier foreign bank entry improves bank performance,
105 the inclination of 
countries to restrict market entry is strong, even taking into account the possibility of 
sequenced liberalisation. Most countries are not against financial liberalisation per se, 
particularly when they wish to make use of foreign capital and expertise for economic 
development and growth. However, the policy that emerges from an overview of their 
financial roadmaps is to concentrate first on increasing the competitiveness of their financial 
markets, mainly through consolidation and encouragement of joint ventures, before allowing 
greater financial liberalisation and introducing foreign competition in full force.
106 
Applications for bank entry in most countries are said to require the submission or fulfilment 
of the following requirements:
107 
1. Draft  by-laws 
2. Organisational  chart 
3.  Financial projections for the first three business years 
4.  Financial information on the main potential shareholders 
5.  Background/experience of future directors 
6.  Background/experience of future managers 
7.  Sources of funds to be used to capitalise the new bank, and 
8.  Market differentiation intended for the new bank. 
When an economic needs test is not applied, and entry is allowed on a purely prudential 
basis, a bank licence will normally be granted upon the fulfilment of prudential criteria, such 
as having (1) a sound capital base and adequate financial resources, (2) fit and proper 
management, and (3) a viable business plan. Nevertheless, three issues may need to be 
raised when considering the entry of foreign banks. The first is whether entry requirements 
are effectively non-discriminatory or provide full and effective national treatment to foreign 
applicants. The second is what juridical forms of entry are permitted for foreign banks. The 
third is whether foreign share ownership of domestic banks is restricted.  
On the one hand, countries may provide preferential treatment to foreign banks. This may be 
in the form of easing entry requirements, by replacing the entry requirements with those 
already fulfilled by the home supervisor. This is based on the notion that the home regulator 
is conducting consolidated supervision, and only limited prudential requirements may be 
necessary. Needless to say, this will be possible only when the home supervisor’s regulatory 
standards and enforcement are considered sufficient and effective.  
On the other hand, foreign banks may be discriminated against, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Some countries clearly state that only a limited number of licences will be granted to foreign 
banks. Implicit entry barriers may sometimes take the form of requesting more information 
upon application, albeit on an informal basis, or slower processing of licence applications.  
Some countries will require a foreign bank to enter in a particular juridical form of commercial 
presence. For example, there is an important distinction between a branch and a subsidiary. 
A subsidiary is a separate legal entity from the main bank, whereas a branch is not. The 
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distinction becomes significant when a foreign bank becomes insolvent. Because a branch is 
part of the legal entity established in the home country, its assets will be directly subject to 
claims by the creditors of the entire bank. In contrast, a subsidiary is an independent legal 
entity, and therefore it will normally be legally shielded from liquidation procedures abroad.  
This will also have direct implications for regulatory capital, and it is the primary reason why, 
as witnessed in the GATS commitments of countries such as Vietnam and Korea, some 
countries have imposed requirements in regard to the assets of the parent bank when 
authorising the opening of a branch. Another approach is to require a certain level of branch 
capital to be set aside for protecting domestic depositors, as in China. 
Acquisition of local banks may be limited, narrowing the possible routes for foreign banks to 
enter the market. Many countries have limits on foreign shareholding of local banks. The 
level of foreign shareholding permitted varies widely, and majority shareholdings are often 
authorised only on a restricted basis, or not at all. 
B. Country  studies
108 
In this section, we will examine three aspects of entry requirements in China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Singapore and Thailand. The choice of countries in our study has been based on the 
availability of information and the significance that entry requirements have had for 
liberalisation.
109 While the main source of information will be the laws and regulations that the 
regulatory authorities have published, we will also use information obtained through 
interviews with various experts in each market. 
(1) China 
Domestic commercial banks are subject to a relatively strict authorisation regime for 
permitted activities and branches. Each activity requires authorisation from the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
110  Interest rates are restricted for deposit rates 
and lending rates (both ceiling and floor rates), in accordance with the People’s Bank of 
China Law.
111 The fees for services that commercial banks provide are also regulated by the 
government.
112 Promissory notes, checks, remittances and payment collection services that 
are settled in the local currency are subject to price controls determined by the CBRC and 
the Ministry in Charge of National Development and Reform Commission. Branching is 
restricted to only one branch and three ATMs in any one city.
113 
(a)  Distinct rules for foreign financial institutions 
China has distinct rules for foreign banks, although they have been eased considerably since 
December 2006, as a result of GATS commitments to liberalise local currency business.
114 
Geographical restrictions on local currency business have been abolished, and foreign 
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and new joint ventures. 
110  See Commercial Banking Law of China, Chapter 3. 
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financial institutions are able to supply local currency business to firms and individuals upon 
fulfilment of certain requirements. However, for the purpose of depositor protection, foreign 
bank branches can only accept local currency deposits from Chinese nationals in the form of 
time deposits greater than one million renminbi. 
Foreign banks are defined as joint capital banks, joint venture banks, and branches and 
representatives of foreign banks. To apply for local currency business, such banks and 
branches must have been operating in China for the previous three years, have been 
profitable for the last two years, and fulfil the prudential requirements of the CBRC. 
Detailed capital and asset criteria have been defined. A foreign financial institution is required 
to hold a minimum of one billion renminbi or equivalent of registered capital, and to allocate a 
minimum of 100 million renminbi operating capital for each branch opened in China.  
There are separate requirements for each type of legal form, as discussed below. Other 
requirements are as follows: the institution must have been continuously profitable, have 
experience in international finance, have measures to combat money laundering, be subject 
to effective regulatory oversight in the home country, and be able to clear other prudential 
requirements. 
The approval process for setting up a foreign bank appears to take considerable time. The 
preparatory approval is said to take up to nine months. This is followed by a final approval 
process which can take up to two months. The applicant is also required to obtain a business 
licence from the local industry and commerce bureau before opening business. 
(b) Legal  forms 
There are separate requirements for each type of legal form that a foreign financial institution 
takes upon entering the Chinese banking market. While foreign bank branches are limited in 
their local currency services, such as the acceptance of local currency deposits, other 
significant obstacles have been removed, resulting in a near national treatment of foreign 
financial institutions. 
Capital investment from a solo foreign financial institution or joint foreign financial institutions 
Holders of capital (or shareholders) in a bank must be financial institutions. Majority shareholders 
must be commercial banks that have had a representative office in China for more than two 
years. The majority shareholder must also have assets greater than US$ 10 billion and fulfil 
the capital adequacy requirements of the CBRC. 
Joint ventures 
Joint ventures are required to be owned by foreign financial institutions and Chinese financial 
institutions. The majority foreign shareholder must be a commercial bank with an established 
representative office, have more than US$ 10 billion in assets, and fulfil the capital adequacy 
requirement of the CBRC. 
Branches of foreign financial institutions 
To establish a branch, the following additional requirements must be satisfied. The parent 
bank must have a minimum of US$ 20 billion in assets, fulfil the prudential requirements of 
the CBRC, and have had a representative office for more than two years. Foreign bank 
branches are limited in their local currency deposit-taking business to time deposits larger 
than one million renminbi. 
Branching restrictions are not limited to foreign banks, but also apply to domestic banks. 
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(c)  Acquisition of local banks 
Acquisition of commercial banks needs to be carried out in accordance with the articles of 
the Company Law and requires the approval of the CBRC. While there are no specific 
regulations on bank mergers, the CBRC is likely to play a central role in allowing an 
acquisition. Mergers of domestic banks are subject to a standard applied to companies of all 
industries, except that the CBRC participates in the process when banks are concerned. 
As for foreign financial institutions, they may acquire the equity of a domestic bank directly or 
indirectly. There is no statutory limitation on the acquisition of listed domestic banks. 
However, the CBRC does not allow foreign financial institutions to acquire more than a 25% 
ownership of unlisted domestic banks. As a result, Chinese bank shares have been heavily 
purchased by foreign financial institutions. By July 2006, 26 foreign financial institutions had 
purchased equity of 18 domestic banks totalling US$ 17.9 billion.  
Foreign banks are now permitted to own 100% of their subsidiary. Ownership of Chinese 
banks by foreigners is limited to 25%, and approval is needed for foreign banks to own more 
than 5% of securities. Ownership of securities houses by foreigners is limited to 25% of 
capital. 
(2) Indonesia 
Indonesia has relaxed its entry barriers to foreign financial institutions considerably since the 
Asian financial crisis in 1998. 
(a)  Distinct rules for foreign financial institutions 
The Banking Law of 1998 permitted the establishment of branches by foreign banks. The 
Banking Law states that non-Indonesian persons or entities cannot establish a commercial 
bank in Indonesia.
115 However, the regulation on commercial banks permits joint ventures to 
be established as commercial banks.
116 
The requirements for a foreign bank opening a branch are similar to those for domestic 
banks, but there are additional requirements for the parent bank.
117 It must: 
•  Have a minimum “A” rating issued by a leading international rating agency 
•  Rank among the 200 largest banks in the world 
•  Have a minimum of 3 trillion rupiah equivalent in paid-up operating funds 
•  Provide a statement from the banking authorities in the country of origin of the 
bank’s head office, stating no objection to the opening of a branch office in 
Indonesia. 
There are no restrictions on the branching of foreign banks, although a licence needs to be 
acquired from Bank Indonesia.
118  There is no discrimination against foreign banks when 
branching in Indonesia. 
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(b) Legal  forms 
A commercial bank is required to be opened as one of the following: a state-owned 
enterprise of limited liability, a regional government enterprise, a cooperative or a limited 
liability company.
119 A foreign bank can establish a commercial presence in the form of a 
branch or a joint venture with a local partner. The legal form of a foreign bank branch must 
correspond to the legal form of the respective head office.
120 
(c)  Acquisition of local banks 
Through numerous relaxations of rules, foreign financial institutions can acquire local banks 
either by purchasing shares in the stock exchange, if they are listed, or through bilateral 
purchase agreements with the domestic bank itself.
121 While the articles of the banking law 
seem to suggest that foreign banks can acquire 100% of the shares of domestic banks,
122 
they are in fact able to acquire 99%.
123  This is said to be an anomaly resulting from 
consideration for national sentiment. 
Controlling shareholders are defined as entities holding more than 25% of voting shares.
124 
This would include holdings within a group structure. Foreigners are permitted to own up to 
99% without the participation of an Indonesian entity.
125 
Those intending to become controlling shareholders are subject to evaluation and interviews 
by the central bank.
126 Controlling shareholders are required to submit a statement of their 
intention to resolve any capital or liquidity problems that the bank faces.
127 
Foreigners are not permitted to acquire rural banks.
128 
(3) Japan 
Japan’s regulation regarding the entry of foreign financial institutions is non-discriminatory. 
There are very few requirements that are specific to foreign banks, other than expecting the 
home regulator to be competent and able to exchange information. 
(a)  Distinct rules for foreign financial institutions 
A foreign bank is defined as any entity authorised to engage in banking under the legislation 
of its home country.
129 In other words, the entity making an application must be a bank in its 
home country. The Banking Law requires foreign banks to obtain a licence from the Prime 
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Minister of Japan to establish a branch, which is delegated to the Commissioner of the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA), except upon initial entry.
130 
Foreign banks must satisfy specific requirements that are also applicable to domestic banks. 
In addition, it must be ascertained that the legal requirements in the foreign bank’s home 
country are similar to those of the Japan Banking Law.
131 
(b) Legal  forms 
In Japan, banks are required to establish themselves as limited liability stock companies 
under the Commercial Code.
132 However, foreign banks are exempted from this requirement 
and do not have to be incorporated in Japan to establish a branch.
133 
(c)  Acquisition of local banks 
Any entity may acquire shares in an existing Japanese bank. However, there are 
requirements imposed on the acquisition of a certain proportion of shares of a local bank. 
When acquiring more than 5% of a bank or a bank holding company’s voting shares, the 
shareholder must file with the FSA.
134 
A person acquiring more than 20% of a local bank’s voting shares becomes a bank major 
shareholder,
135   for which prior approval from the FSA is required.
136  A  bank’s  major 
shareholding can also occur as a result of joint holdings by two or more separate entities. 
Bank primary shareholders are subject to reporting requirements
137  and  on-site 
inspections
138   to ensure the soundness and financial independence of the financial 
institution. 
An entity becomes the controlling shareholder when acquiring 50% of a bank’s voting 
shares.
139  The FSA is given greater authority to intervene in the business of controlling 
shareholders. The FSA can request the submission of business improvement plans or issue 
business improvement orders to controlling shareholders. 
When the bank’s major shareholder is a foreigner or a foreign corporate (including banks), 
the same requirements apply as to domestic shareholders. 
(4) Singapore 
The Singapore government has intentionally segregated the domestic and offshore banking 
sectors, resulting in domestic retail banks being fairly sheltered from international 
competition. 
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(a)  Distinct rules for foreign financial institutions 
Banks are licensed as full banks, wholesale banks or offshore banks. Full banks are able to 
carry out the full range of banking business, while wholesale banks are able to perform all 
banking activities except Singapore dollar retail banking services. Offshore banks can carry 
out the full range of banking operations through Asian currency units (ACUs). 
Of the full banks in Singapore, five are local banking groups and one is a local incorporation 
of a foreign bank. Twenty-three are branches of foreign financial institutions.
140 Foreign full 
banks are restricted in the number of branches, relocation of existing branches and setting 
up of off-premise ATMs. They cannot share ATMs with other banks, or offer Electronic Funds 
Transfer at Point-of-Sale (EFTPOS) services. 
Singapore created a subcategory of the full bank, ie the qualifying full bank (QFB), in 1999 to 
grant foreign branches greater privileges as a result of its bank liberalisation package.
141 The 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) grants the QFB licences and so far six QFBs have 
been awarded.
142  QFBs are allowed to open up to 15 sub-branches and/or off-premise 
ATMs, of which 10 can be sub-branches. QFBs may share ATMs among themselves and 
relocate their sub-branches freely. Since 2002, QFBs have been allowed to provide debit 
services through EFTPOS that access social pension investment accounts and other 
investment accounts. 
Since 2005, QFBs have been allowed to establish up to 25 sub-branches, which may be 
either physical locations or off-site ATMs. The MAS also announced that QFBs will be 
allowed to negotiate with local banks to let their credit card holders obtain cash advances 
through the local banks’ ATM network. 
Foreign bank branches are placed under the same conditions as local banks, but in addition 
are required to hold paid-up share capital of no less than 200 million Singapore dollars, 
which is less than the requirement of 1,500 million Singapore dollars for locally incorporated 
banks. Foreign branches are also required to hold at least 10 million Singapore dollars in a 
head office fund, of which at least five million Singapore dollars must be held in Singapore, in 
assets the MAS deems appropriate. 
(b) Legal  forms 
In Singapore, a bank is defined as any company that carries on banking business under a 
valid licence.
143 The Banking Act does not define a foreign bank, but any bank incorporated 
outside Singapore and holding a valid banking licence under the Banking Act is considered 
to be a foreign bank.
144 Subsidiaries of foreign banks and foreign bank branches are treated 
in the same manner as local banks for regulatory purposes, and as a result, none of the 
foreign financial institutions operating in Singapore is incorporated in Singapore. 
                                                  
140  See MAS website for information on the number of regulated banks: 
  http://www.mas.gov.sg/fin_development/Types_and_Number_of_Institutions.html (accessed on 3 December 
2007). 
141  See MAS website for information on the liberalisation package: 
 http://www.mas.gov.sg/news_room/statements/1999/MAS_Statement_on_Measures_to_Liberalise_Commercial
_Banking_and_Upgrade_Local_Banks__17_May_1999.html (accessed on 7 December 2007). 
142  MAS website, supra, footnote 140. 
143  See Singapore Banking Act, Chapter 19, 2003 revised edition, paras 7 and 79. 
144  Id, paras 7 and 79. BIS Papers No 42  103
 
 
(c)  Acquisition of local banks 
Substantial shareholding of a bank requires the prior approval of the MAS.
145 A substantial 
shareholding is defined as an interest of 5% or more of voting shares.
146 Furthermore, prior 
approval is required when intending to acquire more than 12% and 20% of voting shares, 
including indirect control of a bank.
147 The 12% and 20% thresholds may be attained by the 
aggregate of shares held in a group structure.
148 An indirect controlling person is any person 
who is able to determine the policy of a financial institution without necessarily holding 
shares or controlling the voting power of the institution. The approval for substantial 
shareholding is based on fit and proper criteria of the shareholder and the likely influence the 
bank might receive in conducting prudent business.
149 Furthermore, the Minister of Finance 
can object to existing substantial shareholding if it is not in the national interest.
150 
The MAS has discretion under the Banking Act to deny a bank licence if it establishes either 
that 50% or more of the bank’s issued and paid-up capital is owned by a foreign government, 
or that a majority of persons with control of the bank are appointed by a foreign 
government.
151 
The acquisition of any foreign or local bank in Singapore requires the prior approval of the 




Foreign banks are subject to restrictions that are primarily a result of the reform of the 
financial sector. Domestic banks are also subject to restrictions as a result of the reform 
programme, although foreign banks face restrictions on their branching. 
(a)  Distinct rules for foreign financial institutions 
Thais opening a commercial bank and foreign banks establishing a branch both require the 
permission of the Minister of Finance.
153 Commercial banks are required to be listed stock 
companies with more than 250 shareholders holding more than 50% of the stock.
154 
As part of the financial system reform, the 2004 Master Plan for the Financial Sector outlines 
the entry methods for foreign banks. First, no new commercial banking licences are to be 
issued. However, existing entities can be upgraded to a commercial bank, ie by upgrading 
from a crédit foncier (mortgage bank) that provides mortgage loans, or through local 
incorporation by a foreign bank branch or a bank with an offshore licence. 
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Foreign branches require the permission of the Bank of Thailand for branching, product 
approval, and promotion activities. These activities do not require authorisation in the case of 
Thai commercial banks. Foreign branches are permitted to establish ATMs only in their 
branches. An ATM is counted as one branch, and since only one branch is permitted at a 
time, the result is that foreign banks have few outlets. 
(b) Legal  forms 
A locally incorporated foreign bank is allowed to conduct the same activities as domestic 
commercial banks, but may open only a limited number of branches. 
Foreign bank branches are also allowed the same range of activities as commercial banks. 
However, they are unable to open sub-branches. Once local incorporation is permitted, the 
bank name is expected to be used when acquiring other domestic banks. Locally 
incorporated foreign banks are expected to merge domestic banks and submit a merger plan 
to assist in the reform of the financial sector. 
(c)  Acquisition of local banks 
No person is allowed to hold more than 5% of a commercial bank’s shares. However, to 
enable resolution of problem banks, exemptions were made to this restriction for 
administrative agencies, state-owned enterprises, the Financial Institution Development Fund 
(the de facto deposit insurance fund at the Bank of Thailand), and cases where the Minister 
of Finance gives permission to improve the solvency of a commercial bank.
155 
In principle, more than three quarters of the shares of Thai banks must be held by Thai 
nationals. Further, more than three quarters of the board of directors of commercial banks 
must be Thai nationals. The Minister of Finance may permit exemptions upon the advice of 
the Bank of Thailand. 
Acquisition of commercial banks requires the permission of the Minister of Finance. 
6. Concluding  remarks 
The investigation into competition law, trade commitments, and entry requirements 
demonstrates clearly that there still is a gap between the commitments made and the actual 
environment in which financial institutions operate. It is important to recognise that these 
differences are not in themselves a hindrance to greater regional financial integration, but a 
lack of progress can become a significant impediment. 
Importance of effectively implementing competition laws 
While it is still probably too early to make a definitive assessment of many of the competition 
regimes in Asia, it is clear that further progress in enforcement and compliance will be a 
necessary and important element in realising the spirit of the competition laws being 
implemented in the economies. It is heartening to see that many countries have enacted 
competition laws in recent years; this reflects a deepening recognition of the importance of 
having a statutory mechanism to ensure fair competition, eliminate monopolies and suppress 
anticompetitive practices. 
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Effective enforcement of and compliance with competition law are largely dependent on the 
dissemination of detailed guidelines, on the competence and independence of the 
competition authorities, and on strong and timely administrative and judicial actions against 
serious infractions. It remains to be seen how far the competition regime will be made 
effective as part of the basic infrastructure of a well functioning market economy. 
Indonesia represents the positive effect that the competition policy regime can have on the 
overall liberalisation path and on trade commitments. Indonesia has been actively enforcing 
its competition law regime in a relatively high number of cases. It has been taking steps to 
approach liberalisation in a progressive manner, which reflects its approach to competition 
law. Thus, it provides an insight into the possibilities that a proactive competition policy might 
achieve. 
Narrowing the gap 
While the GATS is seen to have had a great impact on furthering the liberalisation of the 
financial sector, an analysis of subsequent regional trade agreements and a comparison with 
actual entry requirements identifies the gap that remains between them (Table 11). Of the 
countries studied, Indonesia has made marked progress in the liberalisation of its financial 
sector, going well beyond the commitments made under the GATS. On the other hand, many 
other countries have maintained the status quo of the Uruguay Round, or have not narrowed 




Competition law, GATS commitments and actual requirements 
Competition law 
Provisions Index  Enforcement  cases 
GATS and actual 
 
Discriminatory Legal  form  Acquisition 
China      
Competition Law  40  6  None 
GATS Geographical  restrictions 
Local currency business 
restrictions. 
Asset requirement for 
each legal form. 
– 
Actual  High capital requirement, 
continuous profitable 
operations in China.  
Asset requirement for 
each legal form, as well 
as interest holder require-
ment to be commercial 
bank. Branches only 
permitted high net-worth 
time deposits. 
Approval of CBRC, social 
interest for acquisition. 
Shareholding above 25% 
not permitted for 
foreigners. 
Indonesia      
Competition Law  30  13  21 
GATS Branching  and 
geographical limitations. 
Joint ventures. Local 
incorporations are 
considered local banks. 
Acquisition of up to 49% 
of bank shares to be 
permitted. 106  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
Table 11 (cont) 
Competition law, GATS commitments and actual requirements 
Competition law 
Provisions Index  Enforcement  cases 
GATS and actual 
 
Discriminatory Legal  form  Acquisition 
Indonesia (cont)     
Actual  Parent bank’s asset 
requirement, high ranking 
and capital requirement. 
Approval for branch 
establishment. Otherwise 
joint venture. No specific 
differentiation. 
Acquisition of controlling 
shareholding subject to 
BI approval. 
Acquisition of bank shares 
permitted up to 99%. 
Japan     
Competition Law  55  9  233 
GATS  Understanding Understanding – 
Actual  Home country regulation 
is essential. 
Do not need to 
incorporate. 
Five per cent 
shareholding must file. 
Twenty per cent 
shareholding requires 
approval. 
Singapore     
Competition  Law  45 14 None 
GATS  Foreign banks can 
operate from only one 
office. Cannot establish 
off-premise ATMs and 
new sub-branches. 
No new full banks. 
Foreign banks only as 
offshore banks. 
A foreign shareholder can 
only hold up to 5% of 
bank shares. Aggregate 
foreign shareholding of a 
bank is limited to 40%. 
Actual  Foreign banks limited in 
their branching, ATMs 
and subsequent services. 
Asset requirement for HQ 
and branch. 
No need to incorporate.  Five per cent, 12%, 20% 
shareholding of banks 
requires approval. Policy 
not to permit acquisition 
of local banks by foreign 
parties. 
Thailand     
Competition  Law  30 13 9 
GATS New  establishment 
subject to approval. 
Branching of existing 
banks limited to two 
additional ones. 
Branches and incorporate 
banks permitted different 
shareholding levels by 
foreign capital. 
Foreign equity 
participation limited to 
25% of paid-up capital for 
incorporated foreign 
banks. 
Actual  No new banking licences 
to be issued to foreign 
banks. Branching 
requires approval and 
ATM limited to in-branch. 
Incorporation required for 
commercial banking. 
Branches are not 
permitted sub-branches. 
No one is allowed to hold 
more than 5% of bank 
shares. More than ¾ of 
shares must be held by 
Thais. 
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Since the basic spirit of the GATS is for all members to work continuously for progressive 
liberalisation, greater progress needs to take place both in the commitments made and in the 
actual rules imposed, narrowing the gap between the two levels. Progress in competition 
policy will support the underlying foundation of liberalisation. 
It is also noted that regional trade agreements, while increasingly prevalent and preferred by 
countries seeking reciprocal treatment upon liberalisation, do not appear to have made 
noticeable headway compared to the GATS, so far as liberalisation of the financial services 
sector is concerned. One exception may be the United States-Singapore FTA, under which 
Singapore made much deeper commitments towards the United States than in the GATS or 
other FTAs, apparently balanced by the business opportunities provided in other sectors 
under the bilateral agreement. However, even this agreement may be modest in its 
elimination of market access limitations in financial services in the context of the liberalisation 
necessary for greater integration. As for the AFAS and Japan-Singapore EPA, the 
commitments appear to be largely the same as the GATS commitments in financial services. 
Making further progress in future negotiations 
Prudential considerations call for a cautious approach to commitments in trade agreements 
for the liberalisation of financial services. The financial crises that inflicted serious damage on 
the economies of the region seem to justify the caution, even well after the recovery. 
An important issue that needs to be addressed is how to facilitate and encourage the 
willingness to come forward with commitments in financial liberalisation through trade 
negotiations. Trade negotiations typically involve a certain degree of horse-trading in which 
liberalisation offers are made across sectors. The GATS was one of the first opportunities for 
many Asian countries to be involved in financial services trade negotiations, since no 
regional or bilateral framework for such negotiation existed in the region in the early 1990s. 
Strong requests from developed countries in the Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in a 
wide range of financial services liberalisation commitments under the GATS, but these may 
also have made it difficult for Asian countries to come forward independently with further 
liberalisation commitments. The mindset of negotiators may have tilted towards making 
commitments only when and where strong requests were made from their counterparts, not 
necessarily or always on the basis of economic rationale or according to a carefully 
considered strategy. It now appears that the Doha Round negotiations are facing serious 
difficulties as developing countries find it hard to obtain tangible benefits from liberalisation, 
particularly from the developed member countries. 
There is a fundamental need to recognise that the rapidly changing financial market 
environment requires financial markets to function more efficiently, and effective competition 
is necessary for the benefit of consumers of financial services and for economic growth. 
Excessive regulatory control of financial services and markets may succeed in isolating a 
country’s financial sector from global financial crises, but would also inflict heavy efficiency 
losses and considerable costs on the economy. 
Moreover, economic development, particularly for emerging market countries, would be 
difficult without further liberalisation and effective competition in the financial sector. Instead 
of making incremental liberalisation commitments which are realised over as long a period as 
permissible, it would be better for national authorities to develop a properly sequenced 
liberalisation strategy. This would enable further development of the country’s economy 
based on a clearly defined strategy. 
To take an example, Indonesia’s entry requirements for foreign banks have gone well 
beyond the commitments made in trade negotiations. This can be viewed as recognition of 
the country’s need for foreign capital and expertise in developing its financial services sector, 
and as determination to advance the country’s integration into the world economy for further 
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Drawing up an inventory of prudential measures 
At a more technical level, the proliferation of prudential measures exempt from commitments 
under the GATS has made it difficult for countries to move forward to further liberalise their 
financial services sectors, not just under the GATS, but also in FTAs and other liberalisation 
processes. While there are genuine prudential concerns and justifiable measures for 
prudential purposes that should not be eliminated upon liberalising a country’s financial 
services sector, a lack of common understanding and the generally low transparency of the 
measures taken for this purpose may be behind the slow progress in negotiations. Many 
regulations applied in the name of prudential measures may have had the effect of inflicting 
considerable costs and effectively working as barriers to entry into the markets. 
To overcome the weaknesses of the GATS and other FTAs in identifying prudential 
measures and reducing those which may become unnecessary or overly burdensome over 
time, and to assist in the coherent implementation of prudential regulations across countries, 
developing country-by-country inventories of prudential regulations could be an effective first 
step. The difficulty of monitoring developments in member countries after the conclusion of 
negotiations in the WTO is apparent, as reports to the WTO Financial Services Committee 
have been largely anecdotal and not made on a regular and consistent basis across 
countries. The IMF has developed the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) to 
encourage countries to develop standard statistics and publish them on their websites. A 
mechanism like the SDDS could be created to take stock of prudential measures and further 
promote transparency of the financial system. 
The IMF also carries out the Financial Services Assessment Program (FSAP),
156 in which 
member countries are examined by officials of other countries and by IMF staff, to evaluate 
the condition of their financial sector, their observation of international standards and their 
understanding of financial sector regulation. The FSAP has not resulted in an easily 
accessible and up-to-date inventory of prudential regulation for financial services providers 
wishing to enter a country’s market, as many countries do not agree to the publication of 
FSAP reports. The FSAP is also analytical in nature and not descriptive of the entire 
regulatory system, which makes it difficult to use as a database of prudential measures. 
Asia would benefit from the compilation of such an inventory, as regional financial integration 
requires a better understanding of each country’s financial sector regulations. With a 
common format and regular updating, it would also cater for internationally active financial 
services providers in the region. This would greatly improve the transparency of the region’s 
financial systems, and facilitate the negotiation of future liberalisation agreements. 
An inventory would also assist in grasping the level of convergence of regulatory directives in 
the region. The European experience presents a template which could be referred to in this 
respect.
157 The European Directives are in themselves a set of comprehensive directories of 
prudential regulations for each financial services sector or market. A significant level of 
convergence and minimum levels of harmonisation of prudential regulations may be 
necessary in laying the groundwork for true financial integration in the region in practical 
terms. Lack of transparency and of mutual understanding would likely benefit only a handful 
of countries with strong financial services players. If the inventory were based on 
international standards, such as the Basel Core Principles or International Organization of 
                                                  
156  See FSAP Handbook, supra, footnote 37. 
157    The European Union’s market integration in financial services is based on principles of essential 
harmonisation, mutual recognition, home country control of supervision and consolidated supervision. 
Licensing of banks, securities firms, and collective investment schemes is based on a single passport in which 
firms need licensing from only one member state. However, this is possible only with effective implementation 
of the above principles. BIS Papers No 42  109
 
 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) standards, this would not only encourage countries to improve their regulatory 
standards, but would also achieve greater regulatory convergence in the region and 
contribute to regional economic development. Through regulatory convergence, the region’s 
supervisory authorities could develop an Asian prudential regulation handbook, not only 
describing the prudential rules of all countries in the region, but also setting out standard 
interpretations of the rules and related regulatory principles for the financial services sector. 
Such a handbook could be useful both for technical training of officials in the region and for 
enhancing pre-emptive risk management and compliance at financial institutions. 
Mutual recognition and regional integration 
Mutual recognition of regulatory standards is currently being considered among G7 countries. 
This would enable relaxation of, or partial exemption from, regulations for financial 
institutions that have been licensed in a country which has accepted such an agreement. 
Mutual recognition is based on the general compatibility of the countries’ regulatory 
standards, and can be made effective when countries share common goals in regulatory 
policy. Thus, licensing of a financial institution in one country would enable it to provide 
services in another participating country that shares common or similar prudential standards. 
Mutual recognition is the foundation of financial market integration in the European Union 
and is made possible by assurances that certain rules are commonly applied in all member 
states. A prudential regulation inventory would provide an initial step to such progress in Asia 
as well, by clarifying current regulatory measures. 
High convergence of prudential regulation for regional financial integration may be difficult 
without the conclusion of a formal treaty or agreement among Asian countries. However, 
sequential liberalisation of the financial markets based on a broad understanding of 
prudential regulations across countries would facilitate progress towards regulatory 
convergence in this very diverse Asian region. The compilation of a prudential regulatory 
inventory of the region may prove to be an initial but significant first step towards true 
regional financial integration.
158 
Modalities of future negotiations and the development agenda 
A useful by-product of compiling a prudential inventory could be the identification of non-
prudential or semi-prudential measures that do not belong or do not fit well in a prudential 
inventory. Those measures are likely to be “genuine” market access and national treatment 
limitations that should be phased out in stages, in line with the development of the real 
economy. Although there may be no universal formula for phasing out such measures, future 
negotiations could focus better on those measures that constitute “genuine” limitations, 
without possibly entering into a long and difficult debate on what constitutes a prudential 
measure and which measures must be listed as limitations to market access or national 
treatment under the GATS or FTAs. Staging the phase-out properly would be essential, and 
a common understanding on such a strategy could be a useful step towards general 
regulatory convergence and harmonisation in the region. 
                                                  
158    The European Union has been experiencing difficulties in handling emergency situations from a financial 
supervisory perspective. Further sharing of information and common analysis of financial conditions are 
considered to be imperative for the region to further integrate its common market. A common rulebook is being 
proposed by a prominent ex-central banker and current Italian economic and finance minister. See Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, “Europe needs a single financial rulebook”, Financial Times, 11 December 2007, p 13. 110  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
The difficulties faced by the WTO Doha Round negotiations may be arguably, at least in part, 
due to the fact that public opinion has not so far fully embraced the liberalisation process in 
emerging market economies. Suggesting an optimal regulatory framework in competition 
policy, and prudential regulation in financial services, both of which are conducive to 
development and coherent with a country’s development strategy, could be viewed as a 
small but important step towards making progress and establishing a development strategy 



























Abridged schedule of commitments in financial services  
(banking and other financial services) of Asian countries under the GATS 















Foreign exchange, no 
restrictions 
Solely prudential, with no 
economic needs test 
Within 5 yrs: any existing 
non-prudential measures on 
ownership, operation, and 
juridical form shall be 
eliminated 
Subsidiary: 
Total assets > USD 10bn 
Branch: 
Total assets > USD 20bn 
Chinese foreign-joint bank: 





+ 2 cities 
Within 2 yrs 
accession: 
Guangzhou + 4 
cities 
Within 3 yrs: 
Kunming, Beijing  
+ 1 city 
Within 4 yrs: 
Shantou + 3 cities 




3 yrs business 
operation in China 









Within 2 yrs, 
to Chinese 
enterprises 




  Solely prudential, with no 
economic needs test 
Upon accession 
Joint ventures with up to 
33% foreign investment to 
conduct domestic 
securities investment fund 
management 
Within 3 yrs: foreign 
investment increased to 
49% 
Within 3 yrs: foreign joint 
ventures (⅓ minority 
ownership) to engage in 
underwriting and trading 








































Upon accession: capital 
contribution limited to 
30% 
One year after 
accession: foreign 
equity limitation to be 
eliminated 
Upon accession: 
representative office, branch 
of foreign bank, 50% foreign 
capital commercial joint 
venture bank 
April 2007: 100% foreign-
owned banks  
Five years from 
accession: limit local 
currency deposits 
from Vietnamese 












bank has total 





has assets of 
more than 
USD 10bn  
Upon accession: 
representative office, joint 
venture with foreign 
participation of 49% 
Five years from 




































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
India   Only  through  branch 
operations of a foreign bank 
licensed and supervised in 
home country 
Not more than five licences 
a year for both new entrants 
and existing banks 
Investments in other 
financial services 
companies not to exceed 
10% of own funds, or 30% 
of invested company’s funds























Branches: allow with 
Indian bank licence 
Financial services 
company: foreign equity 


































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
Indonesia  All limitations to be 
eliminated by 2020 
subject to similar 
commitments by other 
members 
Newly established foreign 
service provider shall be 
joint venture bank, locally 
incorporated and a banking 
institution, which will be 
unbound 
Acquisition of locally 
incorporated banks listed is 
permitted up to 49% of 
shares 
deposit-taking and lending: 




Foreign bank and 
joint venture open 
branches in Jakarta, 
Surabaya + 7 cities 













Foreign ownership bound 
by laws and regulations. 
Share of listed non-bank 
may be 100% foreign 
owned 
Through establishment of 
a securities broker/dealer 
1 sub-branch and 
1 auxiliary office 
permitted 
Japan Application  of 
Understanding of 
Financial Services 




by branches of 
foreign banks 
Commercial presence for 
investment trust 
management services 
must be juridical person 


































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
Korea  Acquisition of stock of 
domestic companies by 
natural persons or 
juridical persons of 
another member is 
restricted. Foreign 
portfolio investment in 
Korean stocks is 
permitted only for 
listings in Korean Stock 
Exchange, and individual 
foreign investors can own 
up to 6% of each 
company’s total stock 
Amount of foreign direct 
investment must be at 
least KRW 50m 
After establishment of 
commercial presence, 
financial institutions may 
only handle transactions 
denominated and settled in 
won 
Assets owned by branches 
must be kept within territory 
of Korea. Capital of HQ not 
recognised as basis for 
determining the extent of 
funding and lending 
Only branches of foreign 
banks which rank among 
world’s top 500 banks are 
permitted 
A person may own up to 4% 
of bank stock and 15% of 
provincial bank stock 
without special authorisation 
Foreign currency 
loans are restricted 
with respect to 





Unbound Only  representative 
office, branches or joint 
venture companies are 
permitted 
Joint venture’s foreign 
equity participation must 
be at least 50% 
Equity participation in 
existing domestic 
securities is limited to less 


































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
Malaysia  Acquisition by a foreign 
bank of an aggregate of 
5% or more of share-
holding in Malaysian-
owned or -controlled 
commercial bank must 
meet following criteria: 
Foreign bank has ability 
to facilitate trade and 
contribute to financial 
and economic 
development; 
Country of foreign bank 
has significant trade and 
investment interests in 
Malaysia; 
Country of foreign bank 
does not have a 
significant presence in 
Malaysia 
Thirteen wholly foreign-
owned commercial banks 
are permitted to remain 
Entry is limited to equity 
participation by foreign 
banks in Malaysian-owned 
or -controlled commercial 
bank or a merchant bank 
not exceeding 30% 
Commercial bank is not 
allowed to acquire any 
share in another commercial 
bank, but may acquire 
shares in one merchant bank
Merchant bank is not 
allowed to acquire shares in 
a commercial bank 
Other persons are not 
allowed to own more than 
5% shareholding of a 
commercial bank 
Deposit-taking only allowed 
through commercial banks, 
in Labuan 
Foreign commercial 
banks are permitted 
to accept foreign 
currency deposits 
from residents 
subject to conditions 
imposed on 
designated bank 
  Unbound  Trading, dealing and 
underwriting in securities 
require establishment of a 
locally incorporated joint 
venture company and 
aggregate shareholding 


































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
Philippines Appropriate  regulatory 
authority shall determine 






to contribute to 
attainment of Philippine 
development objective 
required 
Monetary Board shall 
ensure that, at all times, 
70% of all resources and 
assets of the banking 
system is held by the 
domestic banks which are at 
least majority owned by 
Filipinos 
Foreign banks must be 
widely owned, publicly 
listed. However, this does 
not preclude secondary 
investment in the equity of a 
locally incorporated bank 
not exceeding 30% of voting 
stock or 40% upon approval 
by President of the 
Philippines 
Bound for 10 new licences 
for full banking authority to 
new and existing foreign 



















  Must be organised as a 
stock corporation 
Subject to foreign equity 
limitation of 51%  
Majority of members of 
Board shall be citizens of 
the Philippines 
An investment house is 
not allowed to engage in 


































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
Singapore    No new full and restricted 
banks. New foreign banks 
may establish only as 
offshore bank branches or 
representative offices 
A single/related group of 
foreign shareholders can 
hold only up to 5% of a local 
bank’s shares. The limit on 
aggregate foreign 
ownership of each domestic 
bank’s shares has been 
increased from 20% to 40% 





















Merchant banks can 


































(banking)  Capital 
participation/licensing 
Thailand    Not bound for existing 
foreign bank branches 
under present shareholding 
structure. New 
establishment is subject to 
licence approved by the 
Ministry of Finance with 
consent of Cabinet 
Existing foreign banks which 
already had their first 
branch prior to July 1995 
will each be permitted to 
open no more than 
2 additional branches 
Locally incorporated banks 
are limited with respect to 
acquisition of shares. 
Maximum foreign equity 
participation limited to 25% 
of paid-up registered capital 
ATM operations permitted 
by joining ATM pools 
operated by Thai banks or 
operation within own 
premises, or sharing 
facilities with other 
commercial banks in 
Thailand 
    At least ¾ of 
directors must 
be of Thai 
nationality 
Market access is limited 
to acquisition of shares of 
existing companies only. 
Unbound for new licences 
Maximum foreign equity 
participation limited to 
49% 
At least half of directors of 
locally incorporated 
securities firms must be 
Thai nationals 
 
 